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INTRODUCTION 
Despite pockets of urban renewal and the determined efforts of its 
loyal citizens, the city of Detroit is a ‘‘shadow of the thriving 
metropolis that it once was,’’ beset by ‘‘decades of fiscal 
mismanagement, plummeting population, employment and revenues, 
decaying City infrastructure, deteriorating City services and excessive 
borrowing that provided short term band-aids at the cost of 
deepening insolvency.’’1  Detroit has more than 140,000 blighted 
properties, and approximately 78,000 ‘‘abandoned and blighted’’ 
structures, some 38,000 of which are considered dangerous.2  In 2012, 
the City’s violent crime rate was five times the national average, and 
higher than any U.S. city with a population greater than 200,000.3  
                                                                                                                 
 1. See, e.g., Declaration of Kevyn D. Orr in Support of the City of Detroit, 
Michigan’s Statement of Qualifications Pursuant to Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy 
Code at 4--5, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. 
E.D. Mich. July 18, 2013) [hereinafter Orr Declaration]; see also Opinion Regarding 
Eligibility at 20--22, In re City of Detroit, Michigan, No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 5, 2013). 
 2. See Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications Pursuant to 
Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code at 25, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-
53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 18, 2013) [hereinafter 
Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications]; Nick Carey, Detroit Blight 
Battle to Take Down Abandoned Buildings Could Be Key to Bankrupt City’s 
Survival, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 25, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/2013/07/25/detroit-blight-abandoned-buildings-bankrupt-_n_3651224.html. The 
number of abandoned and blighted structures represents approximately one-fifth of 
the City’s housing stock.  See id. 
 3. See e.g., Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 12; see also CITY OF 
DETROIT OFFICE OF THE EMERGENCY MANAGER, CITY OF DETROIT: PROPOSAL FOR 
CREDITORS 9 (2013) [hereinafter PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS], available at 
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The homicide rate alone is at the highest level in nearly forty years.4  
Citizens wait almost one hour for police to respond to calls, when the 
national average is only eleven minutes,5 and the City’s case clearance 
rate for violent crimes is ‘‘substantially below’’ that of comparable 
municipalities.6 
Once a thriving industrial center, Detroit’s economy is in shambles. 
The number of jobs in Detroit has declined precipitously over the 
years,7 and the City’s unemployment rate stood at 18.3% as of June 
2012, having nearly tripled since 2000.8  Those Detroiters fortunate 
enough to be employed are likely to earn far less than other residents 
of Michigan, and the percentage of Detroiters living below the 
poverty line is far greater than in Michigan as whole.9  As economic 
conditions have declined, the City’s population has plummeted, 
falling sixty-three percent since the City’s post-War peak and twenty-
six percent since just 2000.10  Economic decline and population loss 
have eroded the City’s tax base, causing tax revenues to plummet11 
even as residents’ per capita tax burden has ballooned.12  The City is 
so cash-strapped that public services for residents and business are 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/EM/Reports/City%20of%20Detroit%20Pro
posal%20for%20Creditors1.pdf. 
 4. See, e.g., Statement of Qualifications Pursuant to Section 109(c) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, at 12, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 18, 2013) [hereinafter Statement of Qualifications]. 
 5. Id. at 12; Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 22; Opinion Regarding Eligibility, 
supra note 1, at 12. 
 6. Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 23. 
 7. See Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 20 (‘‘The number of jobs in Detroit (for 
residents and non-residents) declined from 735,104 in 1970, to 562,120 in 1980, to 
412,490 in 1990, to 346,545 in 2012.’’) (citations omitted). 
 8. PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS, supra note 3, at 1; Orr Declaration, supra note 1, 
at 20 (citing SOUTHEAST MICH. CONFERENCE OF GOV’TS, POPULATION AND 
HOUSEHOLD ESTIMATES FOR SOUTHEAST MICHIGAN (2012), available at 
http://www.semcog.org/uploadedFiles/Population_and_Household_Estimates_for_D
ecember_2012.pdf). 
 9. See, e.g., Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 17 (‘‘Detroiters’ average per capita 
annual income from 2007 to 2011 was $15,261; the median household income for that 
same period was $27,862.43 During that period, an estimated 36% of Detroiters were 
living below the poverty line.  Only 54% of Detroiters owned a home, the median 
value of which was $71,100.  To put these numbers in perspective, the average per 
capita annual income in Michigan from 2007 to 2011 was $25,482,46 the median 
household income was $48,66947 and only 16% of Michigan citizens lived below the 
poverty line.  The state-wide homeownership rate was 74%, and the median home 
value was $137,300.49.’’) (citations omitted). 
 10. See, e.g., PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS, supra note 3, at 1; Orr Declaration, 
supra note 1, at 13--14. 
 11. See, e.g., Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 16, 18. 
 12. See, e.g., id. at 16, 20. 
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now severely inadequate.13  Forty percent of the city’s street lights do 
not work.14  There are reports of abandoned dogs roaming some of 
the City’s streets.15  Photographs of parts of Detroit remind one of 
New Orleans, post-Katrina-----except that in Detroit, the waters of 
decay and decline have been seeping into the city for the past fifty 
years. 
On July 18, 2013, in the face of these challenges, Detroit’s 
Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr filed a petition on behalf of the City 
seeking bankruptcy protection under Chapter 9 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code.16  (As required by Michigan law, Orr filed the 
petition on Detroit’s behalf after having sought and received 
authorization from Michigan Governor Richard Snyder.17)  The City’s 
filings paint a grim picture of Detroit’s fiscal condition.  Detroit has 
more than 100,000 creditors and it owes those creditors more than $18 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See, e.g., id. at 21--22. On March 15, 2013, attorney Kevyn D. Orr was 
appointed emergency manager of Detroit by the Local Emergency Financial 
Assistance Loan Board (LEFALB) created under Sections 141.931--141.942 of the 
Emergency Municipal Loan Act, pursuant to Public Act 72 of 1990 of the State of 
Michigan, also known as Sections 141.1201--141.1291 of the Local Government Fiscal 
Responsibility Act. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., id. at 24. 
 15. See Mark Binelli, City of Strays: Detroit’s Epidemic of 50,000 Abandoned 
Dogs, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/ 
city-of-strays-detroits-epidemic-of-50-000-wild-dogs-20120320; Corey Williams, 
Detroit Stray Dogs Counted in First Survey of City’s Abandoned Pet Population, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 21, 2013, 1:58 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/ 
22/detroit-stray-dogs-survey-count_n_3972292.html#slide=more318123. 
 16. See Bankruptcy Petition, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 
6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 18, 2013).  Orr was appointed Emergency Manager 
in March 2013 after Michigan’s Governor found that a financial emergency existed in 
the City. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 24--31 (for a discussion 
of the events leading the appointment of Orr as Emergency Manager); see also Orr 
Declaration, supra note 1, at 1--3.  As Emergency Manager, Orr acts in the place and 
stead of the City’s elected mayor. Id. 
 17. Statement of Qualifications, supra note 4, at 7--9, 11--14; see also Letter from 
Kevin D. Orr, Emergency Manager, City of Detroit, Mich., to Richard Snyder, 
Governor, State of Mich. & Andrew Dillon, Treasurer, State of Mich. 11 (July 16, 
2013), in Orr Declaration, supra note 1 (attached as Exhibit J) (‘‘The City must be 
specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by name, to be a debtor 
under chapter 9 by State law, or by a governmental officer or organization 
empowered by State law to authorize such entity to be a debtor under chapter 9.  PA 
436 authorizes the commencement of a chapter 9 case by the Emergency Manager 
upon the Governor’s authorization.’’). 
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billion.18  The City’s debts, which are comprised of $11.9 billion in 
unsecured debt and $6.4 billion in secured debt,19 include: 
approximately (a) $5.85 billion in special revenue obligations; (b) 
$6.4 billion in other post-employment benefits, or ‘‘OPEB’’ 
liabilities; (c) $3.5 billion in underfunded pension liabilities based on 
current actuarial estimates; (d) $1.13 billion in secured and 
unsecured general obligation (‘‘GO’’) liabilities; (e) $1.43 billion in 
liabilities under pension-related certificates of participation 
(‘‘COPs’’); (f) $295.5 million in swap liabilities related to the COPs 
and (g) $300 million in other liabilities.20 
The City’s filings state that ‘‘debt service on obligations other than 
those secured by special revenues consumed a staggering 42.5% of 
the City’s revenues in the 2013 fiscal year,’’ a percentage the city 
estimates will increase to 65% of revenues by 2017.21 
Detroit’s bankruptcy petition-----which the City’s public workers 
bitterly oppose22-----raises two issues of first impression with 
implications for bankruptcy law, state and federal Constitutional law 
and municipal securities regulation:  First, can Detroit use Chapter 9 
to reduce or restructure accrued pension rights of retired city workers 
when the Michigan Constitution contains (i) a clause stating that 
‘‘[t]he accrued financial benefits of each pension plan and retirement 
system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be a contractual 
obligation thereof which shall not be diminished or impaired thereby’’ 
(the Pension Clause),23 and (ii) a clause stating that ‘‘[n]o . . .  law 
impairing the obligation of contract shall be enacted’’ (the Contracts 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications, supra note 2, at 44; 
see also Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 5. 
 19. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 5. Detroit is the largest 
municipal bankruptcy case filed in U.S. history. See, e.g., Michael Fletcher, Detroit 
Goes Bankrupt, Largest Municipal Filing in U.S. History, WASH. POST, July 18, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/detroit-files-largest-municipal-
bankruptcy-in-us-history/2013/07/18/a8db3f0e-efe6-11e2-bed3-b9b6fe264871_ 
story.html 
 20. Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications, supra note 2, at 2--3; 
see also Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 7. 
 21. Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications, supra note 2, at 3. 
 22. See, e.g., Objection of the Detroit Retirement Systems to the Motion of 
Debtor for Entry of an Order (I) Authorizing the Assumption of that Certain 
Forbearance and Optional Termination Agreement Pursuant to section 365(c) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, (II) Approving such Agreement Pursuant to Rule 9019 and (III) 
Granting Related Relief, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 
6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 18, 2013); Consolidated Objection of the Retiree 
Association Parties to Eligibility, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 
6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 18, 2013). 
 23. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24. 
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Clause)?24  Second, will debts associated with unlimited tax general 
obligation bonds (UTGO)-----or, bonds backed by the full faith and 
credit or taxing power of the issuer-----be subject to adjustment in 
bankruptcy, when (i) Detroit already is levying taxes at or near 
statutory maximums; (ii) citizens cannot, as a practical matter, absorb 
tax increases due to poverty, economic decline and population loss; 
and (iii) Detroit does not have (and will not have, without 
restructuring) sufficient funds to pay in full both accrued pension 
benefits and general obligation bond debt? 
On December 5, 2013, after extensive briefing and lengthy 
hearings, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District 
of Michigan (Judge Steven Rhodes) issued a landmark 143-page 
opinion regarding Detroit’s eligibility (Opinion Regarding 
Eligibility).25  Citing the Pension Clause, public workers had argued 
that Detroit is not eligible to be a Chapter 9 debtor because the City 
failed to carve out accrued pension benefits and protect them from 
adjustment.26  After cataloging Detroit’s dire financial circumstances 
and the grim realities of life in Detroit, Judge Rhodes held that 
Detroit is eligible to be a debtor despite the failure explicitly to 
protect accrued pension benefits.27  Judge Rhodes further held that 
accrued pension benefits can be adjusted in Chapter 9 proceedings, 
notwithstanding the Pension Clause.  Judge Rhodes reasoned that 
accrued pension benefits are contract rights under Michigan law,28 
and that they can be impaired in bankruptcy along with other 
contracts, without running afoul of United States or Michigan 
Constitutions.29  While Judge Rhodes was careful to emphasize that 
the court ‘‘will not lightly or casually exercise the power under federal 
bankruptcy law to impair pensions,’’30 the opinion (if it stands)31 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Id. art. I, § 10. 
 25. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1. 
 26. Id. at 29. These objections, and others, are discussed below. 
 27. Id. at 5--6, 38--142. 
 28. Id. at 41--44. 
 29. Id.  Judge Rhodes held that ‘‘[t]he [Michigan] state constitutional provisions 
prohibiting the impairment of contracts and pensions impose no constraint on the 
bankruptcy process.’’ Id. at 40. 
 30. Id. at 44. 
 31. Following Judge Rhodes’ ruling respecting eligibility, a number of Objectors 
filed timely appeals, and later moved to certify Judge Rhodes’s opinion regarding the 
City’s eligibility for direct appeal to the Sixth Circuit on an expedited basis. See, e.g., 
Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n, Detroit Police Officers Ass’n, and Detroit Police 
Command Officers Ass’n, Amended Motion to Certify the Court’s Eligibility Ruling 
for Direct Appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, In re City of Detroit, Mich., 
No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E. D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2013); Request of 
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means that that the accrued pension benefits of Detroit’s public 
workers may be subject to impairment in the City’s bankruptcy case.32 
Detroit’s debt crisis and Judge Rhodes’ ruling bring conflicts 
between municipal stakeholders into sharp relief.  First, there are 
Detroit’s residents.  Although they are responsible for paying the 
City’s debts through taxes and fees, they (i) face an enormous tax 
burden, already levied at or near statutory maximums, (ii) have 
limited resources to meet this burden due to population loss, 
economic decline and unemployment, and (iii) face escalating 
expenses, crumbling infrastructure and grossly inadequate services, 
despite their tax burden.  Next, there are public workers, especially 
retired workers with accrued pensions and other post-employment 
benefits.  These workers are not wealthy (pensioners reportedly 
receive an average of $18,000 per year),33 and they were promised 
benefits-----promises supported by the Pension Clause-----but the City’s 
overwhelming debt load makes it difficult to see how these and other 
obligations can be met.  Finally, there are the city’s creditors/lenders, 
including general obligation bondholders, some of whom were 
promised that the city’s taxing power and/or dedicated revenue 
streams would be available for repayment, but who now are being 
told that they should expect substantial losses.  Put simply, Detroit is 
faced with a toxic stew of competing rights and obligations, and it 
cannot simply tax, cut or borrow its way out of economic distress. 
The following Article, examines legal questions presented by 
Detroit’s bankruptcy against the backdrop of this toxic stew.  Part I 
examines the municipality as debtor, and discusses how and why 
municipalities incur debts, and why struggling municipalities like 
Detroit find it difficult to make ends meet.  Part II examines the legal 
questions referenced above and discusses Judge Rhodes’ opinion.  
Part III examines potential reforms, and argues that state and local 
governments ought to develop and implement robust systems to (i) 
                                                                                                                 
International Union, UAW and Flowers Plaintiffs for Certification Permitting 
Immediate & Direct Appeal to the Sixth Circuit from the Court’s Eligibility 
Determinations, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. 
E.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2013).  On December 20, 2013, Judge Rhodes issued a 
memorandum in which he certified that the Objectors’ appeals involve a ‘‘matter of 
public importance’’ under subsection (i) of § 158(d)(2)(A)(i), but recommended that 
authorization for immediate, direct appeal to the Sixth Circuit be denied. 
Memorandum Regarding: I. Certification Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A)(i) II. 
Recommendation on Whether Direct Appeals Should Be Authorized & III. Parties’ 
Request to Recommend Expedited Consideration of Appeals at 9, In re City of 
Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E. D. Mich. Dec. 20, 2013). 
 32. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 80. 
 33. Id. at 6. 
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identify struggling municipalities earlier, (ii) intervene earlier with 
oversight controls, technical assistance (including assistance with 
governance, financial decision-making and internal controls) and 
potentially financial assistance; and (iii) develop robust work-out 
mechanisms before a crisis erupts.  In making these proposals, this 
Article acknowledges that these reforms require political will, which 
inevitably is in short supply.  Consequently, I argue that requiring 
fidelity to the public good-----via a fiduciary standard for public 
officials and other stakeholders (including the financial institutions 
that serve as underwriters and derivatives counterparties in municipal 
securities offerings and related transactions)-----could help to ensure 
that those in a position to obligate the municipality make decisions 
that are in the municipality’s best interest, over the long term. 
I.  THE MUNICIPALITY AS DEBTOR: WHY DO CITIES INCUR 
DEBT, AND WHY DO THEY STRUGGLE TO MAKE ENDS MEET? 
To put Detroit’s fiscal crisis in context, it helps to understand why 
cities incur debt, and why legal, economic and political forces can 
make it difficult for distressed cities to make ends meet.  The next 
section addresses this foundational question, focusing on 
municipalities’ obligation to provide infrastructure and services to 
residents despite legal, economic and political constraints on both 
revenue and debt relief. 
A. Funding Imperative: Public Purpose 
State and local governments face a fundamental fiscal challenge: 
they must spend on infrastructure and public services, but there are 
constraints on revenues available for this work, and few opportunities 
for expense reduction or debt relief.34  Unlike businesses, which may 
scale back operations or reduce head-count when times are tough,  
municipalities cannot close up shop.  Instead, they must provide at 
least basic infrastructure (e.g., roads, bridges, water and sewer plants), 
education (e.g., schools, teachers), and health and safety services (e.g., 
                                                                                                                 
 34. See, e.g., Shaheen Borna & Krishna G. Mantripragada, Morality of Public 
Deficits: A Historical Perspective, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Spring 1989, at 33, 35 
(‘‘The goal of public finance . . . is, ideally, to bring about maximum social 
welfare . . . .’’).  As I have argued elsewhere, this funding imperative means that 
municipalities may have less flexibility than their corporate counterparts respecting 
the timing and amount of borrowing and expenditures, and less flexibility to reduce 
expenses through deferral, head-count reduction or the sale or leveraging of assets.  
See Christine Sgarlata Chung, Municipal Securities: The Crisis of State and Local 
Government Indebtedness, Systemic Costs of Low Default Rages, and Opportunities 
for Reform, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1455, 1481--84 (2013). 
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fire, police, EMS) for residents at all times.  For example, compare 
Detroit’s non-waivable obligation to provide basic infrastructure and 
services (including fire, police, EMS and a public education for its 
children) with smartphone maker Blackberry, Ltd.’s freedom to lay 
off 4500 workers and scale back operations in response to 
deteriorating sales and revenue numbers. 35  Similarly, compare 
Detroit’s obligation to ‘‘stay in business’’ despite its insolvency with 
auto manufacturers’ ability to shutter plants, lay off workers and 
declare bankruptcy in response to fiscal stress.36 
In fact, government’s obligation to remain open for business drives 
spending.  According to the United States Census Bureau’s 2011 
summary of state and local government spending, for example, 
education and utility expenditures ‘‘topped their [local government] 
spending at $599.3 billion and $183.7 billion, respectively.’’37  Public 
safety spending (police and fire in particular) also weighed heavily on 
local governments, according to the Census Bureau,38 as did spending 
on water and gas supply.39  This obligation to spend, even in the face 
of economic stress, can lead to tensions between stakeholders with 
competing claims on limited government resources. 
                                                                                                                 
 35. See, e.g., Hugo Miller, Blackberry to Fire 4,500, Write Down Up to $960 
Million, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-
20/blackberry-to-fire-4-500-write-down-up-to-960-million.html. 
 36. See, e.g., MARIAN KRYZOWSKI & LAWRENCE A. MOLNAR, Univ. of Mich. 
Office of the Vice President for Research, Institute for Research on Labor, 
Employment and the Economy, Impacts of the Automotive Industry’s Restructuring, 
FED. RESERVE BANK CHI., http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/others/events/ 
2009/automotive_communities/presentation_impact_of_restructuring.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2014) (referencing a case study by the University of Michigan’s Institute for 
Labor, Employment and the Economy which found that the closure of a single plant 
(the General Motors’ Moraine Assembly Plant in Montgomery County, Ohio) led to 
the loss of thousands of jobs, and had a total economic impact to the regional 
economy in excess of $700,000); Bill Vlasic & Nick Bunkley, Obama Is Upbeat for 
GM’s Future, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/02/business/ 
02auto.html?_r=0 (discussing General Motors’ 2009 bankruptcy filing). 
 37. JEFFREY L. BARNETT & PHILLIP M. VIDAL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES SUMMARY: 2011 4 (2013), available at 
http://www2.census.gov/govs/local/summary_report.pdf. 
 38. Cf. id. (‘‘Public safety spending (comprised of police, fire, and corrections) 
was dominated by local governments, with the exception of spending on corrections. 
Local governments comprised 86.7 percent of the state and local government total 
spending on police protection. Spending on fire protection was an entirely local 
government function. State government spending comprised 63.9 percent of state and 
local government spending on correction.’’). 
 39. Id. (‘‘Utility spending was also dominated by local governments, with 
spending on water supply and gas supply almost entirely conducted by local govern-
ments, at 99.4 percent and 99.8 percent, respectively.’’). 
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1. The Challenge of Meeting Basic Infrastructure and Public 
Service Needs in the Face of Fiscal Constraints. 
Detroit’s obligation-----and current inability-----to meet public safety 
needs ‘‘bring[s] the depth of [the City’s] service delivery insolvency 
into stark relief,’’40 and demonstrates how a city’s obligation to spend, 
even in the face of fiscal hardship, can accelerate financial collapse 
and pit stakeholders against one another.  As noted in the 
Introduction, Detroit’s public safety needs are enormous and unmet, 
and the City’s large geographic footprint, depopulation and 
expanding blight continue to worsen the situation.41  Today, the City’s 
over-burdened police and fire resources are disproportionately 
diverted to distressed areas in far-flung regions of the of the City 
which are ‘‘littered with abandoned, forfeited or foreclosed land and 
structures,’’ and which have become a ‘‘breeding ground’’ for crime.42  
Of the 11,000 to 12,000 fires that the City experienced each year for 
the past ten years, approximately sixty percent have occurred in 
blighted and unoccupied buildings, forcing police and fire 
departments to expend precious resources fighting blazes in vacant, 
dangerous structures.43  Even getting to these locations is difficult: the 
City’s infrastructure for police, fire and EMS is so ‘‘aged, 
inadequately maintained and lack[ing in] modern technology’’ that it 
has ‘‘been reduced to accepting charitable donations to inspect its 
ground and truck ladders and to upgrade its fleet (donations which do 
not begin to resolve the issues plaguing the City’s vehicle fleet).’’44  
The cost of making a material dent in urban blight, and thus 
(hopefully) reducing the burden on fire and public safety services, 
could ‘‘easily exceed half a billion dollars’’ according to the City45-----
resources the City clearly does not have.46  Moreover, even if the City 
                                                                                                                 
 40. See Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications, supra note 2, at 
23. 
 41. For a series of maps which reflect the City’s population decline, and the 
challenge of address public health and safety given Detroit’s geographically large 
footprint, see Robert Linn, The High Cost of Free Walking, MAPPING STRAIT (Dec. 
8, 2011, 3:19 AM), http://mapdetroit.blogspot.com/2011/high-cost-of-free-
walking.html; The Shrinking of Detroit, MAP SCROLL (June 13, 2009, 5:29 PM), 
http://mapscroll.blogspot.com/2009/06/shrinking-of-detroit.html. 
 42. See Memorandum In Support of Statement of Qualifications, supra note 2, 
24--25 (citing Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 5). 
 43. Id. at 25. 
 44. Id. at 26. 
 45. Id. at 25. 
 46. See, e.g., Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 37--41. 
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could reduce blight, it still would not be able to make the kind of 
public safety investments needed to put the City back on track. 
B. Legacy Liabilities: A Driver of Indebtedness 
1. Pensions and OPEB: A Gordian Knot for Municipal Officials 
If the City’s public safety needs are obvious, however, finding the 
resources to address these needs has become a Gordian knot.  In part, 
this difficulty is because paying for public safety involves costs 
associated with current work force (fire, police, EMS) as well as 
legacy expenses associated with retired workers who worked (and 
were promised benefits) during earlier, less cash-strapped times.47  As 
noted above, Detroit’s legacy pension and OPEB obligations are 
enormous, representing more than half of the City’s outstanding debt, 
and the City’s poverty and economic decline make it difficult to see 
how it can ever satisfy its legacy expense-related debts.48 
To understand why legacy obligations are so large and challenging 
for Detroit, it helps to remember that Detroit’s pension plans have 
design challenges and funding obligations not shared by most private 
employers.49  For example, public pension plans must address the lack 
of social security participation and coverage for certain workers, and 
in some cases, earlier mandatory retirement ages.50  Detroit’s Police 
and Fire Retirement System (PFRS) administers the pension plan for 
the City’s uniformed personnel,51 and these retirees generally are not 
eligible for Social Security retirement benefits or disability benefits.52  
The legal and accounting regimes applicable to public and private 
                                                                                                                 
 47. See, e.g., id. 
 48. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 3--8 (citing City’s report of 
$5.7 billion in OPEB liabilities as of June 2011 (the most recent actuarial data 
available), $3.5 billion in underfunded pension liabilities based on current actuarial 
estimates), $1.43 billion in liabilities under pension-related certificates of obligation 
(COP); and $346.6 million in swap liabilities related to the COPs and noting burden 
these amounts impose on City’s finances). 
 49. See Paul M. Secunda, Constitutional Contracts Clause Challenges in Public 
Pension Litigation, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 263, 263--71 (2011). 
 50. Id.; see also PUB. PLANS PRACTICES TASK FORCE OF THE AM. ACAD. OF 
ACTUARIES, RISK MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC PLAN RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 5 (2010), 
available at http://actuary.org/pdf/pension/PPPTF_Final_Report_c.pdf (‘‘State and 
local workers were excluded from Social Security, at its inception, and thus, 
subsequently, many states and local governments endeavored to establish plans.’’). 
 51. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 6. 
 52. Id. (citing Objection of the Detroit Retirement Systems to the Eligibility of 
the City of Detroit, Michigan, to be a Debtor Under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy 
Code at 5, In re City of Detroit, Michigan, No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. 
E.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2013)). 
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pension plans also are different, and rules for public sector plans vary 
from state to state.53  In Detroit’s case, for example, the Pension 
                                                                                                                 
 53. See Secunda, supra note 49, at 263--71. For example, the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), does not apply to governmental 
plans. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 4(b), 29 
U.S.C. § 1003 (2012); ERISA § 3(32).  There also are differences in the budgeting 
process and accounting standards applicable to public pensions which can make it 
difficult for workers and citizens to understand the nature, scope, and extent of 
liabilities associated with pension and OPEB obligations. See Secunda, supra note 49, 
at 263--71.  The Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) establishes 
generally accepted accounting principles that are used by many state and local 
governments. See Mission, Vision, and Core Values, GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BD., http://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Page/GASBSectionPage&cid= 
1175804850352 (last visited Mar. 15, 2012) (stating the mission of MSRB is ‘‘[t]o 
establish and improve standards of state and local governmental accounting and 
financial reporting that will: [r]esult in useful information for users of financial 
reports, and [g]uide and educate the public, including issuers, auditors, and users of 
those financial reports’’). Unlike Generally Accepted Accounting Standards for 
Commission registrants, however, compliance with GASB standards is not 
mandatory in all jurisdictions.  For example, the Texas legislature enacted a law that 
requires the State, and permits local governments, not to use GASB statement 45, 
which requires the governmental entities that provide health care, life insurance and 
other post-employment benefits to retirees to report the estimated accrued cost of 
the benefits. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 2266.051, 2266.052, 2266.102 (West 
2008); see also Summary of Statement No. 45: Accounting and Financial Reporting 
by Employees for Postemployment Benefits Other Than Pensions, GOVERNMENTAL 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. (June 2004), http://www.gasb.org/st/summary/ 
gstsm45.html.  So, while there are a number of GASB pronouncements concerning 
pension-related obligations (see list below), individual issuers may or may not comply 
with them when reporting on financial obligations in this area. See, e.g., STATEMENT 
NO. 25: FINANCIAL REPORTING OF DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS AND NOTE 
DISCLOSURES FOR DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS, GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BD. (1994), available at http://www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?site= 
GASB&c=Document_C&pagename=GASB%2FDocument_C%2FGASBDocument
Page&cid=1176160029908 (follow ‘‘Accept’’ hyperlink) (establishing financial 
reporting standards for public defined benefit pension plans) (Note: GASB approved 
an exposure draft on June 27, 2011 which would amend GASB Statement No. 25); 
STATEMENT NO. 27, ACCOUNTING FOR PENSIONS BY STATEMENT AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYERS, GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. (1994), 
available at http://www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?site=GASB&c=Document_C& 
pagename=GASB%2FDocument_C%2FGASBDocumentPage&cid=1176160029312 
(follow ‘‘Accept’’ hyperlink) (establishing standards for pension information in the 
financial reports of state and local government employers) (Note: GASB approved 
an Exposure Draft on June 27, 2011 which would amend GASB Statement No. 27); 
STATEMENT NO. 50, PENSION DISCLOSURES, GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BD. (2007), available at http://www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c= 
Document_C&pagename=GASB%2FDocument_C%2FGASBDocumentPage&cid=
1176159988758 (follow the ‘‘Accept’’ hyperlink) (amending GASB Statement Nos. 25 
and 27); STATEMENT NO. 67, FINANCIAL REPORTING FOR PENSION PLANS-----AN 
AMENDMENT OF GASB STATEMENT NO. 25, GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BD. (2012), available at http://www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c= 
Document_C&pagename=GASB%2FDocument_C%2FGASBDocumentPage&cid=
1176160220594 (follow the ‘‘Accept’’ hyperlink); STATEMENT NO. 68, ACCOUNTING 
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Benefit Guarantee Corporation does not insure pension benefits 
under either PFRS or the City’s General Retirement System (GRS), 
which administers the pension plan for the City’s non-uniformed 
personnel.54  In addition, as discussed below, the Michigan Pension 
Clause prevents the City and the State from impairing accrued 
pension benefits in ways that might be available to private employers 
under the federal employee benefits regime.55 
Perhaps most importantly, Detroit’s defined benefit pension plans 
have funding and benefit obligations not shared by most private 
sector employers.56  In contrast to the private sector, where defined 
contribution plans are the norm, public sector employers like Detroit 
are much more likely to offer defined benefit plans.57  With defined 
contribution plans, workers contribute to their own retirement 
through retirement savings accounts (e.g., a 401k).58  Workers bear 
the risk of underfunding with defined contribution plans, because if a 
worker fails to contribute, contributes an insufficient amount, or if 
investment choices do not perform as well as the worker had hoped, 
the worker’s retirement account value may suffer,59 but the employer 
                                                                                                                 
AND FINANCIAL REPORTING FOR PENSIONS-----AN AMENDMENT OF GASB STATEMENT 
NO. 27, GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. (2012), available at 
http://www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=Document_C&pagename=GASB/Docume
nt_C/GASBDocumentPage&cid=1176160220621 (follow ‘‘Accept’’ hyperlink);. 
 54. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 6. 
 55. See id. at 42 (citing MICH. CONST. art. 9, § 24; Kosa v. Treasurer of State of 
Mich., 292 N.W.2d 452, 455 (Mich. 1980) (finding that State and City cannot 
unilaterally impair pensions under Michigan Pension Clause, and noting that clause 
resulted from an effort by teachers to ‘‘lobb[y] for a constitutional amendment 
granting contractual status to retirement benefits.’’)); see also In re Constitutionality 
of 2011 PA 38, 806 N.W.2d 683, 693 (Mich. 2011) (‘‘The obvious intent of § 24, 
however, was to ensure that public pensions be treated as contractual obligations 
that, once earned, could not be diminished.’’); see generally Secunda, supra note 49. 
 56. See Secunda, supra note 49, at 267--74. 
 57. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NATIONAL 
COMPENSATION SURVEY: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES MARCH 2013, 
at 177, 366 (2013), available at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2013/ebbl0052.pdf. 
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics March 2013 National Compensation 
Survey, eighty-nine percent of state and local government workers have access to 
retirement plans. Id.  at 366 tbl. 2.  Eighty-three percent of those with access have 
access to a defined benefit plan, while only thirty two percent have access to a 
defined contribution plan. Id.  By comparison, the survey revealed that only sixty-
four percent of private sector workers have access to a retirement plan, and of those 
with access, only nineteen percent have access to a defined benefit plan compared to 
fifty-none percent with access to a defined contribution plan. Id. at 177. 
 58. See Secunda, supra note 49, at 269--72. 
 59. See id. 
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has no direct obligation to help or otherwise ‘‘make up’’ for losses.60  
With defined benefit plans, however, employees are promised a 
specific monthly benefit based upon a formula.61  To fund promised 
benefits, employers and employees make contributions into an 
investment pool.62  The employer makes investment decisions on 
behalf of the pool, assumes market risk, and must make up the 
difference if pool is insufficient to pay promised benefits.63 
The public employer’s obligation to ‘‘make up the difference’’ if 
plan assets fall short gives rise to the risk and problem of 
underfunding.  Underfunding occurs when a defined benefit plan 
sponsor fails to make contributions (or sufficient contributions) to 
fund accrued actuarial liabilities.  In Detroit’s case, the pension 
systems for public workers have a substantial underfunding problem.64  
At the end of the City’s 2012 fiscal year, Detroit’s two retirement 
systems (the GRS and PFRS) together had over 20,000 employees 
receiving benefits, an additional 2400 former employees who were 
entitled to but who were not yet receiving benefits, and more than 
9,700 active employees who had an expectation of receiving benefits 
                                                                                                                 
 60. See id. at 269--272 (‘‘Of course . . . a larger percentage of these private-sector 
pension plans are now defined contribution plans, meaning that employers are 
generally not responsible for having sufficient funds on hand when employees retire.  
These employers simply make a one-time contribution (or none at all if the employer 
is dealing with a Section 401(k) deferral plan without a matching contribution) and 
there are no subsequent pension funding responsibilities. Simply put, employees in 
the defined benefit context are left with the responsibility of planning so that they 
have enough in their pension fund account when they retire.’’) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 61. See id. at 268--69. 
 62. See id. at 268--69; 2011 Annual Survey of Public Pensions: State and Local 
Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, www.census.gov/govs/retire (last visited Feb. 11, 2014) 
(spreadsheet entitled ‘‘Revenues By State and Local Government’’). According to 
the United States Census Bureau’s 2011 Annual Survey of Public Pensions, in 2011, 
employees contributed $40,298,909 to defined benefit plans whereas employers (state 
and local) contributed a total of $96,184,812. See id. (spreadsheet entitled ‘‘Revenues 
By State and Local Government’’).  For best practices respecting funding defined 
benefit plans, see Best Practice: Guidelines for Funding Defined Benefit Pensions 
(2013) (CORBA), GOV’T FIN. OFFICERS ASS’N, http://www.gfoa.org/index.php? 
option=com_content&task=view&id=2598 (last visited Feb. 11, 2014) and Best 
Practice: Reviewing, Understanding and Using the Actuarial Valuation Report and 
Its Role in Plan Funding (CORBA) (2013), GOV’T FIN. OFFICERS ASS’N, http:// 
www.gfoa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2756 (last visited Feb. 
11, 2014). 
 63. See Secunda, supra note 49, at 268--69. 
 64. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 6. There has been 
considerable debate in the bankruptcy court respecting the degree of underfunding. 
See e.g., id. 
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when they retire, according to the City’s bankruptcy filings.65  Using 
current valuation assumptions and methods, as of June 30, 2011, the 
GRS and PFRS had unfunded actuarial accrued liabilities of 
approximately $639.9 million, according to the City’s calculations.66  
According to the City’s bankruptcy papers, the actual amount of 
these liabilities is likely far higher, as current assumptions and 
valuation methodologies ‘‘serve to substantially understate the 
Systems’ unfunded liabilities.’’67  These legacy liabilities are a 
substantial drain on Detroit’s resources: Judge Rhodes found that 
38.6% of the City’s revenue was consumed by servicing legacy 
liabilities in 2012,68 and that ‘‘forecasts for subsequent years, assuming 
no restructuring, are 42.5% for 2013, 54.3% for 2014, 59.5% for 2015, 
63% for 2016, and 64.5% for 2017.69 
Detroit’s situation is not unique.  According to the Pew Center on 
the States, as early as 2008, there was a $1 trillion gap between the 
$2.35 trillion that states and participating localities had set aside to 
pay pensions,70 health care, and OPEB71 promised to public sector 
employees, and the $3.35 trillion in estimated actual cost.72  More 
recently, the Pew Center found that ‘‘thirty cities at the center of the 
nation’s most populous metropolitan areas faced more than $192 
billion in unpaid commitments for pensions and other retiree benefits, 
primarily health care, as of fiscal 2009,’’ including ‘‘a long-term 
                                                                                                                 
 65. See Declaration of Charles M. Moore In Support of the City of Detroit, 
Michigan’s Statement of Qualifications Pursuant to Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, at 4--5, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931  (Bankr. 
E.D. Mich. July 18, 2013). 
 66. Id. at 5. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 7. 
 69. See id. at 7; see also Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications, 
supra note 2, at 3. 
 70.  According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), ‘‘[n]early 20 
million employees and over 7 million retirees and survivors are covered by state and 
local government pension plans.’’ U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GOVERNANCE PRACTICES AND LONG-TERM INVESTMENT STRATEGIES HAVE 
EVOLVED GRADUALLY AS PLANS TAKE ON INCREASED RISK 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/308867.pdf. 
 71.  Pension and OPEB liabilities have been the subject of significant debate and 
analysis in recent years. See, D. Roderick Kiewiet, The Day After Tomorrow: The 
Politics of Public Employee Retirement Benefits, 2 CAL. J. POL. & POL’Y, Sept. 2010. 
 72.  PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, THE TRILLION DOLLAR GAP: UNFUNDED STATE 
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS AND THE ROADS TO REFORM 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2010/Trillion_Dollar_Gap_Und
erfunded_State_Retirement_Systems_and_the_Roads_to_Reform.pdf. 
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shortfall of $88 billion for pensions and $104 billion for retiree health 
care and other non-pension benefits.’’73 
Anecdotally, in addition to Detroit, other municipalities across the 
United States have identified public workers’ salary, pension benefits 
and OPEB as contributing to fiscal distress.  For example, San 
Bernadino, California sought Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection in 
2012 after declining home prices, falling tax revenues and increasing 
expenses rendered the city insolvent.74  In finding the city to be an 
eligible debtor, the bankruptcy court commented that that ‘‘[c]ity 
employee salaries and benefits, as in most municipalities, make up 
75% of the City’s budget and, as the need for services grew in the 
[pre-recession] boom, so did the number of City employees and 
consequent expenses.’’75  ‘‘Adding to these costs’’ according to the 
judge ‘‘were the particularly lucrative retirement benefits which the 
Common Council had negotiated in the collective bargaining 
agreements with the City’s seven unions.’’76  Public employee 
contracts, pension and/or OPEB also have been identified as drivers 
of distress in Central Falls, Rhode Island (filed for bankruptcy in 
2011),77 and Stockton, California (filed for bankruptcy in 2012).78 
As the Pew Center has observed, and as the situation in Detroit 
reflects, unfunded pension and retiree health care plans pose 
significant challenges for city budgets, citizens and public workers.79  
For public workers and retirees, underfunding (and the potential for 
associated loss or diminution of benefits, or impaired stability of the 
plan) can have a devastating impact on personal financial condition 
because, in the absence of social security, there is no safety net.  For 
cities, underfunding ‘‘limit[s] policymakers’ ability to invest in other 
priorities because ‘‘[e]very dollar that goes to plug a hole in the city’s 
                                                                                                                 
 73. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, CITIES SQUEEZED BY PENSION AND RETIREE 
HEALTH CARE SHORTFALL 1 (2013), available at http://www.pewstates.org/ 
uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2013/Pew_city_pensions_brief.pdf. 
 74. Voluntary Petition, City of San Bernadino, Cal., No. RS 6:12-bk-28006 MJ 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2012); City of San Bernardino Eligibility Opinion at 778--
80, In re City of San Bernadino, Cal., 499 B.R. 776 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2013) (No. RS 
6:12-bk-28006 MJ). 
 75. City of San Bernadino Eligibility Opinion, supra note 74, at 779. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Scott Malone, Rhode Island’s Central Falls Files for Bankruptcy, REUTERS, 
Aug. 1, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/01/us-rhodeisland-
centralfalls-idUSTRE7703ID20110801. 
 78. See, e.g., Jim Christie, Stockton Bankruptcy The Result of 15-year Spending 
Binge, REUTERS, July 4, 2013, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/04/ 
stockton-bankruptcy_n_1648634.html. 
 79. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 73, at 1--2. 
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retirement funds is a dollar that cannot be spent’’ on infrastructure 
and services.80  In practical terms, this means that fewer dollars are 
available for public safety, education and infrastructure, as 
municipalities are forced to allocate resources to pension and OPEB-
related obligations.  And for taxpayers, the longer unfunded pension 
and OPEB liabilities go unaddressed, ‘‘the larger the bill facing future 
city budgets and taxpayers,’’ such that municipalities may be forced to 
‘‘cut services, reduce the workforce, or raise taxes’’ to shore up 
underfunded or unfunded retirement or OPEB-associated funds.81  
Cities and their taxpayers also pay a price for underfunded or 
unfunded pension and OPEB liabilities in the form of higher 
borrowing costs (assuming the city’s finances are strong enough to 
access the municipal securities market on reasonable terms), because 
‘‘credit rating agencies incorporate unfunded retirement costs into 
their analyses.’’82  All of these negative consequences are manifest in 
Detroit.83 
It is important to note that demographic trends like those present 
in Detroit may exacerbate the problem of underfunding, or (at a 
minimum) lead to increased demand on benefits pools.  When a 
workforce ages, the number of active participants paying into the 
system may decrease, even as benefit payments to retired workers 
increase.  According to Census Bureau data, the ratio of active 
members to beneficiaries of state and locally administered pension 
systems has changed over time, with the result that there are now 
fewer active members supporting a larger number of beneficiaries: 
  
                                                                                                                 
 80. Id. at 1--2. 
 81. Id. at 2. 
 82. Id. 
 83.  According to the City’s bankruptcy filings, legacy liabilities (together with 
Detroit’s debt load) have made it difficult, if not impossible, for Detroit to access 
debt markets. See Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications, supra 
note 2, at 28; Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 38 (‘‘[T]he City’s ability to access 
credit markets to satisfy its cash needs is compromised by its plummeting credit 
ratings.  The City’s credit ratings have reached historic lows and currently are below 
investment grade.  No major U.S. city has a lower credit crating that Detroit.  As of 
June 17, 2003, S&P and Moody’s had lowered Detroit’s credit ratings to CC and 
Caa3, respectively.’’) (citations omitted). 
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These data mean for every beneficiary receiving period payments 
under a public pension defined benefit plan, there are now fewer than 
two active members paying into the pension system.85  As the number 
of active workers decreases and the number of retired workers 
increases (in 2011, the total number of beneficiaries eligible for 
periodic payments increased 4.4%), the demand for benefits 
increases.86  As a result, even though pension plan revenues were up 
in 2011, due to the recovery of the stock market from lows 
experienced during 2008 and 2009, total payments for state and 
locally-administered increased as well (they were 8.5% higher in 2011 
compared to 2010, due primarily to a 7.6% increase in benefits 
payments.)87  This puts pressure on benefits pools.  A number of 
public officials have voiced concerns about the changing ratio of 
current versus former workers: Syracuse, New York Mayor Stephanie 
Miner, for example, has commented that her city is ‘‘upside down’’ 
                                                                                                                 
 84. ERIKA BECKER MEDINA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC 
PENSIONS: STATE- AND LOCALLY-ADMINISTERED DEFINED BENEFIT DATA SUMMARY 
REPORT: 2011, at 1 (2013), available at http://www2.census.gov/govs/retire/ 
2011summaryreport.pdf. 
 85. Id. at 2. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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with respect to health care expenses, in that the city pays more for 
health care for its retired workers than it does for those still working.88 
Macroeconomic forces also can intensify fiscal distress associated 
with pension and OPEB liabilities.  According to the United States 
Census Bureau, declines in the stock market during 2008 and 2009 
exacerbated the problem of underfunding in public pension systems: 
 
  89 
 
 
Notably, stock market declines put pressure on state and local 
government budgets at the same time that ‘‘the recession . . . cut into 
state and local tax revenues, limiting the ability of governments to 
make up these shortfalls.’’90 
C. Municipal Revenue Sources: Inelastic and Constrained by 
Legal, Economic, and Political Forces 
If municipalities already face a difficult funding mandate, legal, 
economic and political constraints on revenues and debt relief make 
their burdens that much heavier.  When a business needs money for 
                                                                                                                 
 88. See Jimmy Vielkind, Is Detroit Bankruptcy Prelude to Upstate Crisis?, TIMES 
UNION (July 24, 2013, 6:40 AM), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Is-Detroit-
bankruptcy-prelude-to-upstate-crisis-4682870.php. 
 89. MEDINA, supra note 84, at 2, 5. 
 90. ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., CNTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH AT BOS. COLL., 
PENSION OBLIGATION BONDS 1 (2010), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/ 
uploads/2010/01/SLP_9-508.pdf (citing proprietary data). 
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profit-seeking activities or to satisfy debts, it may tap a variety of 
sources, including profits from existing operations, returns on 
investment activity, bank loans, and/or the issuance of equity or debt 
securities.91  For-profit enterprises also may free up funds for business 
activities and debt service by reducing capital expenditures, cutting 
expenses (e.g., through efficiency gains, headcount reductions), 
selling assets, restructuring existing obligations, or entering into a 
corporate combination or other transaction with a fiscally stronger 
counter-party.92 
Municipalities are in an entirely different position.  They spend in 
service of the public good, not for profit, and they cannot issue equity 
securities to raise capital.93  Municipalities also cannot easily reduce 
headcount or salary costs, 94 leverage or sell assets, or combine with 
                                                                                                                 
 91. For example, AMC Entertainment Holdings, reportedly the second largest 
movie theater owners in North America announced in September 2013 that it sought 
to raise $400 million via an initial public offering of stock and that it planned to use 
the proceeds of the offering for capital expenditures and to reduce debt. See William 
Alden, AMC Aims to Raise $400 Million in I.P.O., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2013, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/03/amc-aims-to-raise-400-million-in-i-p-o/?_r=0. 
 92. For example, the mining company Rio Tinto announced last year that it was 
cutting expenditures and looking into selling business units to reduce its debt burden. 
See Rio Targets Debt Reduction in 2014 As Costs Come Down, REUTERS, Dec. 11, 
2013, available at http://finance.yahoo.com/news/rio-targets-debt-reduction-2014-
134409096.html. Likewise, Air France also announced a restructuring program last 
year that including that includes layoffs, route restructuring and other measures in a 
bid to reduce the airline’s debt and return to profitability. See Nicola Clark, Air 
France Plans to Cut 2,800 More Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/19/business/air-france-plans-to-cut-2800-more-
jobs.html. 
 93. See, e.g., ROBERT S. AMDURSKY ET AL., MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE §§ 1.1.1--1.1.2, at 3--9 (2013) (discussing municipalities’ focus 
on public good); ERIC FRIEDLAND, FITCH RATINGS, SPECIAL REPORT: TOP TEN 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MUNICIPAL BONDS AND CORPORATE BONDS 2 (2010), 
available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_rating_agency_101118_ 
hearing_fitch_doc3.pdf (noting corporations can raise equity, but municipalities 
cannot). 
 94. In addition to the need for personnel to administer public infrastructure and 
services, municipalities cannot easily reduce headcount because they are much more 
likely than their private sector counterparts to operate in a union environment.  
According to the data from the Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 
2012, public-sector workers had a union membership rate (35.9%) more than five 
times higher than that of private-sector workers (6.6%), with local government 
workers having the highest union membership rate at 41.7%. See Union Membership 
News Release: Union Members-----2012, BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Jan. 23, 2012), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01232013.htm (‘‘In 2012, 7.3 million 
employees in the public sector belonged to a union, compared with 7.0 million union 
workers in the private sector.  The union membership rate for public-sector workers 
(35.9 percent) was substantially higher than the rate for private-sector workers (6.6 
percent).’’).  Union rates are highest at the local government level because local 
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other governmental units to reduce expenses and/or raise funds.95  
Instead, municipalities depend upon three principle sources of 
revenue-----(i) fiscal assistance from higher levels of government, (ii) 
taxes, assessments and use fees; and (iii) borrowing.  Each of these 
sources is vulnerable, volatile, constrained and potentially risky for 
municipalities and taxpayers, especially during times of financial 
distress. 
1. Raising Revenues Through Grants and Tax Increases Is Legally, 
Politically and Practically Difficult 
Relying upon assistance from higher levels of government is risky 
because the federal and state governments simply do not have the 
resources, the legal authority or the political will to fund every 
infrastructure project or public service need that a municipality might 
have, nor can higher levels of government bail out every city, town, 
village, school district, fire district, water and sewer district, etc. that 
might be struggling. 96  In fact, the lack of grant money for 
                                                                                                                 
government payrolls include workers in heavily unionized occupations, such as 
teachers, police officers, and firefighters. Id.  In 2012, among full-time wage and 
salary workers, union members (making no distinction between public and private 
sector) earned more on average than their non-union counterparts: whereas union 
members had median usual weekly earnings of $943 according to Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) data, those who were not union members had median weekly 
earnings of $742. Id.  Focusing on local government workers, BLS data reflect that in 
2012, median weekly earnings of full-time wage and salary workers who were 
members of unions ($989) or represented by a union ($975) exceeded that of non-
union local government workers ($756). Id.  The BLS attributes this disparity to a 
variety of factors including but not limited to collective bargaining. See id.  In 
addition to a wage disparity in favor of unionized public workers, data also suggest 
that state and local government employees are less likely to be laid off compared to 
their private sector counterparts. ALICIA MUNNELL & REBECCA CANNON FRAENKEL, 
CNTR FOR RET. RESEARCH AT BOS. COLL., PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS AND JOB 
SECURITY (2013), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/ 
SLP31.pdf.  Taken together, this data suggests that public employers’ labor costs may 
be higher and less elastic than those of non-union private sector employers. 
 95. Mergers and/or consolidation of municipalities have long been controversial. 
See, e.g., Ted Roelofs, Should Two Towns Become One? Merger Question Moves to 
Saugatuck-Douglas, BRIDGE MAG. (Oct. 6, 2013), http://bridgemi.com/2013/10/ 
should-two-towns-become-one-merger-question-moves-to-saugatuck-douglas. 
 96.  See, e.g., MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVS., U.S. PUB. FIN., SPECIAL COMMENT, 
POTENTIAL RISKS OF VARIABLE RATE DEBT AND INTEREST RATE SWAPS FOR U.S. 
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ARE HEIGHTENED BY ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 6 (2009) (on file with author) (‘‘The ability to quickly adjust revenues and 
expenditures is a valuable mitigant to the potential cash flow and liquidity impact of 
variable rate debt and swaps.  To measure an issuer’s ability to generate additional 
revenues, we consider the nature of the revenue streams that are pledged or are 
available to support the issuer’s variable rate debt and swaps, as well as any legal or 
procedural restrictions that would prevent the issuer from receiving sufficient 
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infrastructure and services, coupled with the cost of these items, 
explains why state and local governments turned to-----and now 
depend upon-----the municipal securities market to meet funding 
needs.97  In Detroit’s case, declines in state revenue sharing funds 
have put pressure on the City’s finances: according to bankruptcy 
filings,’’[s]tate revenue sharing [from Michigan to the City] has 
decreased by $161,000,000 since 2002 (48%) and by $76,000,000 
(30.6%) since 2008, due to the City’s declining population and 
significant reductions in statutory revenue sharing by the State.’’98  
Since revenue sharing is tied to population, the City anticipates that 
‘‘[r]evenue sharing amounts will decrease further if the City’s 
population continues to decline.’’99  While the federal and/or state 
governments might still help Detroit, the sheer size of Detroit’s debt 
makes it difficult to believe that Detroit’s problems can be solved by 
grant money alone. 
As for tax increases, they are difficult in the best of times.  For 
residents of financially strapped cities like Detroit, which face a 
structural, long-term erosion of population and tax bases, they may be 
impossible for all intents and purposes.100  Detroit’s residents already 
                                                                                                                 
revenues within the necessary time frame.  For example, Moody’s considers whether 
levy limits or political reluctance may prevent an issuer from increasing property 
taxes or utility fees as needed.  If the issuer is able and willing to raise revenues, we 
consider the timeframe in which the increased collections will be received, as delayed 
receipts may not help the issuer with immediate cost pressures.’’). 
 97. Hildreth and Zorn argue that the growth in the size and complexity of the 
municipal securities market was ‘‘born[] out of necessity’’ beginning in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, as state and local governments were facing ‘‘mounting capital need 
and fewer degrees of freedom to deal with these needs because of high interest rates, 
inflation and a slowing economy, reduction in federal aid as a result of concern over 
mounting budget deficits, and tax and expenditure limitations on state and local 
governments.’’ W. Bartley Hildreth & C. Kurt Zorn, The Evolution of the State and 
Local Government Municipal Debt Market Over the Past Quarter Century, 25 PUB. 
BUDGETING & FIN 127, 132--33 (2005). 
 98. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 10. 
 99. PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS, supra note 3, at 4. 
 100. See Robert Tannenwald, Are State and Local Revenue Systems Becoming 
Obsolete, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., no. 4, 2001, at 28--30. As Robert Tannenwald 
points out, the long-term erosion of the tax base in cities like Detroit represents a 
structural problem, especially when municipal budgets shrink while public needs 
increase: 
An analysis of the mix of the nation’s subnational revenues reveals two 
reasons why both state and local governments are so concerned about the 
long-run erosion of their tax capacity. First, both depend heavily on 
uncertain flows of fiscal assistance from a higher level of government. 
Second, many state and local governments lack a diverse mix of ‘‘own-
source revenues’’-----taxes and user charges that they collection on their own 
authority. 
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face an overwhelming tax burden: the City’s filings note that ‘‘[t]he 
per capita tax burden on Detroit residents is the highest in 
Michigan.’’101  This burden ‘‘is made heavier still by the residents’ 
relative inability to pay,’’ due to the low level of per capita income in 
Detroit and an unemployment rate which is more than double the 
national average.102   And, even if Detroit’s citizens had the means to 
absorb tax increases, tax cap legislation makes the legal authority for 
any such increase legally suspect.  Michigan Public Act 394 of 2012 
fixed Detroit’s maximum income tax rates at their current levels,103 
and state law limits on property tax rates and certain utility users’ 
taxes are fixed and at statutory maximums.104  The City has taken the 
position in bankruptcy that ‘‘even if it were advisable’’ to increase 
taxes (which, according to the city ‘‘it almost certainly is not’’) the 
City is legally incapable of raising revenue through additional 
taxation.’’105  Finally, while the City has increased corporate tax rates 
and enhanced its collection activities, such measures will not be 
enough to bridge the City’s funding gap.106 
                                                                                                                 
Id. at 28. 
 101. See Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 20. 
 102. Id. 
 103. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.503(2) (2006); see also Orr Declaration, supra note 
1, at 20--21; Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications, supra note 2, at 
29--30. 
 104. Michigan law limits municipalities’ property tax rates to twenty mills. MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 117.3 (‘‘Each city charter shall provide for all of the following: . . . (g) 
the annual laying and collection taxes in a sum, except as otherwise provided by law, 
not to exceed 2% of the taxable value of the real and personal property in the city.’’); 
id. § 117.5 (‘‘(1) A city does not have power to do any of the following: (a) To 
increase the rate of taxation now fixed by law, unless the authority to do so is given 
by a majority of the electors of the city voting at the election at which the proposition 
is submitted, but the increase in any case shall not be in an amount as to cause the 
rate to exceed 2%, except as provided by law, of the assessed value of the real and 
personal property in the city.’’).  A constitutionally-required rollback limits property 
tax rates to 19.952 mills (which is the rate that Detroit now charges). CITIZENS 
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF MICH., DETROIT CITY GOVERNMENT REVENUES REPORT 
382, at 15 (2013), available at http://www.crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/2010s/2013/ 
rpt382.pdf. Utility users’ tax and casino wagering tax are likewise fixed at current 5% 
and 10.9%, respectively, under state law. See MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 141.1152(1), 
432.212(4), (6), (7) (2006). 
 105. Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications, supra note 2, at 29--
30. 
 106. See Opinion of Eligibility, supra note 1, at 80. 
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2. Municipal Securities and Wall Street: A Critical, but Potentially 
Risky, Source of Funding 
Borrowing to pay for infrastructure, public services or to meet day-
to-day funding needs also creates risks and burdens for cities and 
their taxpayers.107  While the municipal securities market is a critical 
source of funding for government activities, it carries risks for 
municipalities and their taxpayers due to the nature of the security for 
municipal bonds, risks associated with complex securities, limits on 
citizens’ ability to monitor and police borrowing, and the difficulties 
that municipalities and taxpayers face in getting relief from associated 
debts. 
a. Municipal Securities 
Municipal bonds are debt securities issued by states and their 
political subdivisions and instrumentalities108 to pay for public projects 
like the construction of water, sewer and power plants, highways, 
bridges, hospitals and schools, and to meet day-to-day funding 
needs.109  The municipal securities market is sometimes referred to as 
the tax-exempt market because interest paid on eligible municipal 
bonds may be exempt from federal income tax, state, and/or local 
taxes, depending on the characteristics of the instrument and the 
residence of the bondholder.110 
                                                                                                                 
 107. See, e.g., AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 93, §§ 1.1.3--1.4, at 9--48 (discussing 
municipalities’ use of debt to fund improvements, history of state and local 
government indebtedness and characteristics of municipal bonds). 
 108.   See, e.g., id. §§ 1.3--1.4, at 29--48.  Instrumentalities include entities like 
school districts, special districts, and public authorities.  While a detailed examination 
of public authorities is outside the scope of this Article, a bit of history is useful.  
State and local governments began to create public authorities and special districts in 
the early 1900s to build housing, coordinate economic development incentives, 
provide low-cost loans, treat wastewater, operate electric utilities, and construct 
hospitals, among other rationales. See William J. Quirk & Leon E. Wein, A Short 
Constitutional History of Entities Commonly Known as Authorities, 56 CORNELL L. 
REV. 521 (1971); Lynn Wilson & Clayton Eichelberger, New York State Public 
Authority Reform: Where We Have Come From and Where We Need to Go, N.Y. 
STATE BAR ASS’N GOV’T, L. & POL’Y J., Fall 2009, at 15--16.  Over the past fifty years, 
the number of authorities and special districts has grown significantly. See U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS: 2002 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, 
at vii--viii, 6 (2002), available at https://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/gc021x1.pdf. 
 109.  SEC, REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET 5 (2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/munireport073112.pdf. 
 110. See 26 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).  The tax exemption has been the source of some 
controversy over the years. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988); 
Rosalyn Y. Carter & W. Bartley Hildreth, The Evolving Regulatory Environment of 
State and Local Tax-Exempt Securities, 4 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. MGMT. 491, 493--
97 (1992); Joan Pryde, The Ongoing Battle: Almost 70 Years of Assaults on the Tax-
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Traditionally, municipal securities issuers used two types of 
bonds-----general obligation bonds and revenue bonds.111  General 
obligation bonds are secured by the taxing power or ‘‘faith and credit’’ 
of the issuer,112 and generally are subject to laws which restrain state 
and local governments from incurring debt113 without voter approval 
or from exceeding debt limits.114 Issuers use long-term general 
                                                                                                                 
Exempt Municipals, BOND BUYER, Sept. 1991, at 84.  There are also taxable 
municipal bonds (including fully taxable municipal bonds and municipal bonds 
subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax under the IRC).  I do not address this 
segment of the market in this Article, nor do I examine the Build America Bond 
program as authorized by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 
123 Stat. 115. 
 111. See, e.g., AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 93, §§ 1.3.3--1.3.4, at 37--45.  In 
addition to the types of securities listed above, municipal securities issuers have used 
a variety of other instruments over the years. See, e.g., JOE MYSAK, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF MUNICIPAL BONDS: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO MARKET EVENTS, STRUCTURES, 
DYNAMICS, AND INVESTMENT KNOWLEDGE (2012).  Moral obligation bonds are one 
such example.  According to the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), a 
self-regulatory organization charged with establishing fair practices and conduct rules 
for firms and individuals involved in the underwriting, trading and selling of 
municipal securities: 
The term ‘moral obligation bond’ refers to a bond, usually issued by a state 
or agency, that is secured by a non-binding covenant that any amount 
necessary to make up any deficiency in pledged revenues available for debt 
service will be included in the budget recommendation made to the state 
legislature or other legislative body, which may appropriate moneys to 
make up the shortfall.  The legislature or other legislative body, however, is 
not legally obligated to make such an appropriation.  Unlike a general 
obligation pledge, the moral obligation bond does not require voter 
approval and does not have the state’s official pledge of its full faith and 
credit. 
See Certain Types of Municipal Securities, MUNICIPAL SECURITIES RULEMAKING 
BD., http://www.msrb.org/Municipal-Bond-Market/About-Municipal-Securities/ 
Types-of-Municipal-Securities.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2014).  There are also so-
called ‘‘double-barreled’’ bonds, which are ‘‘secured by a defined revenue source as 
well as the faith and credit of an issuer with taxing power.’’ See id. 
 112.  See, e.g., State Government Finances-----Definitions, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/govs/state/definitions.html  (last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (noting 
full-faith and credit debt refers to ‘‘[l]ong-term debt for which the credit of the 
government concerned, implying the power of taxation, is unconditionally pledged. 
Includes debt payable initially from specific taxes on nontax sources, but representing 
a liability payable from any other available resources if the pledged sources are 
insufficient’’). Whereas general obligation bonds issued by local governments 
typically are secured by ad valorem property taxes, state government bonds tend to 
be secured by sales and income taxes. See Certain Types of Municipal Securities, 
supra note 111. 
 113. Debt limits imposed by state and local law are a form of risk management. See 
AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 93, § 4.1.1, at 207--15. 
 114. Historically, debt limits were enacted after the failure of projects that were 
financed with bonds secured by the issuer’s faith and credit. See id. at 210.  As 
Amurdsky and Gillette point out, ‘‘The demise of these enterprises led to increased 
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obligation bonds to finance public facilities that do not produce 
revenues, or when it is thought to be inappropriate to levy fees for use 
as a matter of public policy.115  If an issuer defaults on a general 
obligation bond, bondholders typically have the right to compel a tax 
levy or a legislative appropriation.116 
Revenue bonds are bonds secured by revenues or receipts from the 
funded project or other special funds, and are not backed by the 
taxing power or taxable property of the borrower.117  The idea behind 
revenue bonds is that issuers will use funds raised through bond 
offerings to construct facilities that, ‘‘theoretically, through the 
imposition of fees or charges, will generate sufficient revenues to 
                                                                                                                 
property taxes to pay bonds, or to default and subsequent loss of access to credit 
markets, while constituents of the issuer received nothing of commensurate value in 
return.’’ Id.  In addition to straightforward limits, municipal entities may be subject to 
state statutes designed to spread the costs of public projects over time.  For example, 
New York law prohibits municipalities, school districts or public corporations from 
incurring indebtedness for a period longer than the useful life of the project as set 
forth in the statute. See N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 11 (McKinney 2013); see also CAL. 
CONST. art. XVI, § 18(a) (‘‘No county, city, town, township, board of education, or 
school district, shall incur any indebtedness or liability in any manner or for any 
purpose exceeding in any year the income and revenue provided for such year, 
without the assent of two-thirds of the voters . . . .’’).  Note, however, that the courts 
have recognized qualifications to requirements like those set forth in section 18. See, 
e.g., L.A. Cnty. Trans. Comm’n v. Richmond, 643 P.2d 941 (Cal. 1982) (holding that 
the transit commission is not a ‘‘special district’’ so a two-thirds vote is not required). 
Note also that debt limits may not apply to certain court-ordered expenditures. See, 
e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 57 (1990) (‘‘It is therefore clear that a local 
government with taxing authority may be ordered to levy taxes in excess of the limit 
set by state statute where there is reason based in the Constitution for not observing 
the statutory limitation.’’). 
 115. See Ann Judith Gellis, Mandatory Disclosure for Municipal Securities: A 
Reevaluation, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 15, 23 (1987) (‘‘Long-term general obligation bond 
financing, once the mainstay of municipal financing, is used for funding those public 
facilities that either do not produce revenues (for example, town halls, police stations 
etc.), or for which it is considered, as a matter of public policy, inappropriate to levy 
fees for public use (for example, public schools or parks).’’). 
 116. See, e.g., 15 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 
(3d ed. 1995). 
 117. See, e.g., AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 93, § 1.3.4, at 41--45.  Revenues 
pledged for repayment may be derived from ‘‘operation of the financed project, 
grants or excise or other specified non-ad-valorum taxes.’’ Certain Types of 
Municipal Securities, supra note 111. ‘‘Some revenue bonds are issued by 
governmental agencies to fund facilities for essential public services,’’ like water and 
sewer systems. Id. With these types of revenue bonds, the issuer typically pledges 
revenues obtained through assessments towards repayment. Id. Such pledges 
typically identify the specific assessments that the issuer can use to pay interest and 
repay principal, the issuer’s authority and ability to increase assessments to satisfy 
payment and repayment obligations, and any other, superior claims on the 
assessment. Id. 
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amortize the debt over the useful life of the facility.’’118  As a result, 
‘‘revenue bond financing has traditionally been associated with the 
construction of toll roads, bridges, and community water, sewer, and 
power systems.’’119  Issuers may not be required to obtain voter 
approval before issuing revenue bonds.120 
More recently, issuers seeking to access lower interest rates 
available at the short end of the yield curve have used complex 
instruments such as variable rate demand obligations (VRDO),121 
                                                                                                                 
 118. See Gellis, supra note 115, at 22; see also ROBERT L. BLAND, A BUDGETING 
GUIDE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT 171 (2d ed. 2007) (‘‘[A] revenue bond represents a 
limited pledge of revenue sources to the repayment of qualifying bonds.  Usually, 
revenue bonds are used to finance a revenue producing project such as a public 
housing complex, public hospital, toll road, water or wastewater facilities and lines, or 
a parking garage.  Only revenues earned from the project can be used to repay the 
bonds used to build the facility.  The government does not pledge its full faith and 
credit to the repayment of these bonds, although it may subsidize the project with 
general tax revenues, especially during the development phase.  Because of the more 
limited pledge, voter approval is usually not required, and the bonds incur slightly 
higher interest rates because of the higher risk of default.  However, investors can see 
a clear link between the use of the debt and the repayment of the bonds, which 
normally increases their confidence that the government will repay the debt.’’). 
 119. See Gellis, supra note 115, at 22. 
 120. BLAND, supra note 118, at 171.  Conduit or industrial development bonds also 
have been used for many years. See Kenneth W. Bond, Conduit Financing: A Primer 
and Look Around the Corner, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N GOV’T L. & POL’Y J., Fall 2009, 
at 69.  Conduit bonds are debt instruments that governmental units issue for the 
benefit of conduit borrowers (typically private not-for-profit entities) in furtherance 
of a public purpose, such as the construction of a not-for-profit hospital, affordable 
housing projects, student loan programs, and economic development and 
redevelopment projects. Id. at 69--70.  Not surprisingly, the concept of ‘‘public 
purpose’’ has been the subject of considerable discussion in the case law. See, e.g., 
Poe v. Hillsborough Cnty., 695 So. 2d. 672 (Fla. 1997) (involving issuance of bonds 
payable from sales and tourist tax proceeds to finance construction and development 
of a stadium and practice field for lease to a sports franchise was valid because 
primary public purpose was served by the development of recreation facilities and 
tourist attractions and private benefit or gain enjoyed by franchise owner was 
incidental).  For a discussion of the rationale and origins of the ‘‘so-called public 
purpose doctrine,’’ see AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 93, § 3.1, at 113--26; see also 26 
U.S.C. § 141 (2012) (covering private activity and qualified bonds). 
 121. For a brief, ‘‘plain English’’ description of VRDOs, see Understanding 
Variable Rate Demand Obligations, ELECTRONIC MUN. MARKET ACCESS, 
http://emma.msrb.org/educationcenter/UnderstandingVRDOs.aspx (last visited Mar. 
2, 2014).  Generally speaking, VRDOs are municipal securities for which the interest 
rate resets on a periodic basis, and which permit investors to liquidate their holdings 
at par through a ‘‘put’’ or ‘‘tender’’ feature. Id.  A dealer or remarketing agent is 
responsible for reselling tendered VRDOs to new investors, and, to ensure that 
investors are able to use the ‘‘put’’ or ‘‘tender’’ feature in the event a remarketing 
agent is unable to locate a new purchaser.  VRDOs typically operate with a liquidity 
facility (typically a letter of credit or Standby Bond Purchase Agreement). Id.; see 
also MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVS., supra note 96, at 3 (‘‘The majority of Moody’s 
rated municipal issuers of variable rate demand obligations use dedicated bank 
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auction rate securities and interest rate swaps in their funding plans.122  
While markets for these types of instruments contracted during the 
recent economic crisis, complex non-traditional securities (including 
derivatives) remain very much a part of the current landscape, and 
even smaller issuers now regularly use these more complicated and 
potentially volatile products to meet funding needs.123  As noted 
above, in Detroit’s case, the City appears to have used a range of 
instruments to meet funding needs, including general obligation 
bonds, revenue bonds, and more exotic instruments such as the 
Certificates of Participation (COPs) and interest rate swaps discussed 
below.124  Debt service and related obligations on these instruments 
all have contributed to the City’s financial distress. 
b. Risks Associated with Pledging Taxing Power, Revenue Streams 
Although stalwarts of municipal finance, even ‘‘plain vanilla’’ 
general obligation bonds and revenue bonds carry risks for issuers 
and taxpayers because of the nature of the security pledged.  When 
issuers sell general obligation and revenue bonds to investors, they 
                                                                                                                 
liquidity facilities (either standby bond purchase agreements or letters of credit) to 
support potential tenders by investors.’’). 
 122. See Registration of Municipal Advisors, 76 Fed. Reg. 824 (proposed Dec. 20, 
2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) (‘‘[T]he municipal securities market has 
experienced a proliferation of complex derivative products beginning generally with 
interest rate swap transactions in the mid 1980’s.’’); see also Erik Sirri, Testimony 
Concerning Credit Default Swaps, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 20, 2008), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts112008ers.htm.  According to the then-
SEC chair in a speech from 2010, seventy percent of issuers of VRDOs have entered 
into floating-to-fixed swap agreements. See Andrew J. Donohue, Dir., Div. of Inv. 
Mgmt., SEC, Remarks at Investment Company Institute 2010 General Membership 
Meeting (May 7, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/ 
spch050710mls.htm. 
 123. See, e.g., SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, MUNICIPAL BOND CREDIT REPORT 
FOR FOURTH QUARTER 2011, at 3 (2011) (‘‘Issuance of variable-rate demand 
obligations (VRDOs), long-term municipal bonds with a floating interest rate that 
resets periodically and a put feature, rose in the fourth quarter.  According to 
Thomson Reuters, $11.4 billion were issued in 4Q’11, more than double the amount 
from 3Q’11 ($3.5 billion), but a 6.5 percent decline year-over-year ($11.4 billion).’’); 
see also Elisse B. Walter, Comm’r, SEC, Regulation of the Municipal Securities 
Market: Investors Are Not Second Class Citizens (Oct. 28, 2009), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch102809ebw.htm (providing Commissioner 
Elisse Walter’s commentary on use of complex financing tools). 
 124. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Qualifications, supra note 2, at 2--3; Orr 
Declaration, supra note 1, at 33--36; PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS, supra note 3, at 23--
34; OFFICE OF CITY MANAGER, CITY OF DETROIT: PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 18--29 (June 14, 2013), available at 
http://www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/EM/Reports/City%20of%20Detroit%20Exe
cutive%20Summary%2061413.pdf. 
800 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLI 
pledge their taxing power and dedicated revenue streams, 
respectively, as security for repayment.  If taxes or revenue streams 
run short, the issuer may have to increase taxes and/or cut spending to 
meet repayment obligations.  Since taxpayers must pay government 
levies, and depend upon public infrastructure and services, tax 
increases, spending cuts and insolvency can have a devastating impact 
on private and public life. 
For example, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania was forced into 
receivership after it experienced difficulty repaying general obligation 
bonds associated with a trash incineration project.125  In announcing 
the city’s intention to miss payments due on general obligation bonds, 
Harrisburg’s receiver explained that his ‘‘first priority as receiver is to 
ensure that vital and necessary services such as police and fire are 
maintained’’ within Harrisburg during the state of fiscal emergency.126 
The receiver explained that Harrisburg would not make a payment 
due on the bonds ‘‘to ensure sufficient cash flow so the citizens of 
Harrisburg continue to receive essential services,’’127 reflecting the 
competition for municipal resources that can arise when a 
municipality experiences financial distress.  Similarly, Jefferson 
County, Alabama reported punishing cuts to public services following 
its default on bonds issued to pay for water and sewer services and 
subsequent bankruptcy.128  Service cuts can be particularly painful and 
politically difficult in distressed cities like Detroit that are already 
                                                                                                                 
 125.  See, e.g., GOB-Smacked: Harrisburg to Default on General Obligation 
Bonds, INVESTMENT NEWS (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/ 
20120309/FREE/120309870. 
 126. Id.; see also Romy Varghese, Harrisburg Pennsylvania Plans Default on Bond 
Payments, BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-
03-09/harrisburg-pennsylvania-set-to-default-on-5-dot-27-million-go-bond-payments 
(explaining that Harrisburg, Pennsylvania was placed into receivership at the end of 
2011, with the receiver announcing that the city would have to skip $5.27 million in 
payments due on general obligation bonds to meet basic public service needs). 
 127.  GOB-Smacked: Harrisburg to Default on General Obligation Bonds, supra 
note 125; see also Varghese, supra note 126 (explaining that Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 
was placed into receivership at the end of 2011, with the receiver announcing that the 
city would have to skip $5.27 million in payments due on general obligation bonds to 
meet basic public service needs). 
 128. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, In Alabama, a County That Fell Off the 
Financial Cliff, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/ 
business/jefferson-county-ala-falls-off-the-bankruptcy-cliff.html?pagewanted=all&_ 
r=1& (discussing public services in Jefferson County, Alabama gutted after the 
county declared bankruptcy in 2011 in the wake of a corruption scandal tied to more 
than $1 billion in municipal bond debt and related interest rate swaps). 
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struggling to meet basic public infrastructure and health and safety 
needs.129 
c. Complex Securities Intended to Manage Pension and OPEB 
Introduce Risk, May Deepen Insolvency 
Using complex securities to manage debts and funding needs may 
exacerbate risk for state and local governments, especially when 
products carry interest rate risk, the possibility of early-termination 
fees, and other variables.130  In Detroit’s case, in 2005 and 2006, the 
City entered into a series of funding transactions to address accrued 
liabilities associated with the city’s various pension systems ‘‘through 
arranging for the issuance of certificates of participation [COPs] 
supported by services contracts between the City and each of the 
General Retirement System Service Corporation and the Police and 
Fire Retirement System Service Corporation’’ via specially created 
vehicles.’’131  The City’s goal was to ‘‘raise $1.4 billion for its 
underfunded pension funds, the GRS and the PFRS.’’132  After 
creating a non-profit servicing corporation for each of the two 
pension funds to act as intermediary, the City entered into service 
contracts with each of the corporations,133 pursuant to which the City 
                                                                                                                 
 129. See Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 21--33; see also Roger Lowenstein, 
Broke Town, U.S.A., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/ 
magazine/06Muni-t.html?pagewanted=all; Bobby White, Scars of Bankruptcy Linger 
in Vallejo, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles 
/SB10001424052970204555904577167013455352608 (discussing tax increases and 
reductions in public services in Vallejo, California after the city declared bankruptcy 
in 2008 in the face of declining revenues, soaring costs and municipal bond-related 
obligations). 
 130. As the Government Finance Officers Association has commented,  
Derivative products can be important interest rate management tools 
that, when used properly, can increase a governmental entity’s financial 
flexibility, provide opportunities for interest rate savings, alter the 
pattern of debt service payments, create variable rate exposure, change 
variable rate payments to fixed rate and otherwise limit or hedge 
variable rate payments.  Recent market experience has also shown, 
however, that derivatives, when used to hedge a particular bond issue, 
can limit an issuer’s flexibility with respect to such bond issue. 
Government Finance Officers Association Use of Debt-Related Derivatives Products 
and the Development of a Derivatives Policy  (2003, 2005 and 2010), GOV’T FIN. 
OFFICERS ASS’N, http://www.gfoa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id 
=1590 (last visited Feb. 6, 2014). 
 131. See Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 33; see also Opinion Regarding 
Eligibility, supra note 1, at 7--8. 
 132. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 7. 
 133. Id. 
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pledged to make payments to the service corporations.134  Each COP 
represented ‘‘an undivided proportionate interest’’ in the payments 
that the City had pledged to make to the service corporations under 
the service contracts.135  (The service corporations had created 
funding trusts, which issued debt obligations to investors (namely, the 
COPs).136)  To make the COP offerings more attractive to investors, 
the City purchased insurance from two bond insurers-----XL Capital 
Assurance, Inc., now known as Syncora, and Financial Guarantee 
Insurance Company.137  At the end of fiscal year 2012, the aggregate 
outstanding amount of these certificates was approximately $1.45 
billion.138 
Concurrently with the issuance of certain of these certificates, 
certain of these special entities also entered into various pay-fixed, 
receive variable interest rate swap transactions in an aggregate 
notional amount of $800,000,000139 to hedge cash flows related to 
interest on its COP debt obligations.’’140  An interest rate swap is a 
contract between two parties to exchange a series of fixed rate and 
floating rate interest payments over a defined period of time, without 
exchanging the underlying principal amount, which is referred to as a 
‘‘notional’’ principal amount.141  Municipal securities issuers use 
interest rate swaps to convert interest rate basis (e.g., from floating to 
                                                                                                                 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 33 -- 34. 
 139. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 7; see also Orr Declaration, 
supra note 1, at 34. 
 140. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 7; see also CITY OF 
DETROIT FINANCE DEP’T, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT (CAFR) 
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 20, 2012, at 33 (2012), available at 
http://emma.msrb.org/EP731053-EP567459-EP968879.pdf. 
 141.  The MSRB describes interest rate swaps (and their characteristics and uses) 
as follows: 
A specific derivative contract entered into by an issuer or obligor with a 
swap provider to exchange periodic interest payments.  Typically, one party 
agrees to make payments to the other based upon a fixed rate of interest in 
exchange for payments based upon a variable rate. The swap contract may 
provide that the issuer will pay to the swap counter-party a fixed rate of 
interest in exchange for the counter-party making variable payments equal 
to the amount payable on the variable rate debt. 
Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Interest Rate Swap Contract or Agreement, 
MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BOARD, http://www.msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/ 
INTEREST-RATE-SWAP-CONTRACT-OR-AGREEMENT.aspx (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2014). 
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fixed or fixed to floating) to manage liabilities, and (ideally) to enable 
issuers to lower their costs of borrowing.142 
While swaps offer the potential for up-front cost savings, they 
involve risks not present in other financing alternatives.143  For 
example, changes in reference interest rates have caused losses in 
swap positions taken by hundreds of municipalities, according to the 
consulting firm National Economic Research Associates (NERA).144  
NERA’s research suggests that, in some cases, as interest rates have 
fallen during the crisis, municipalities have lost money on floating-to-
fixed swap agreements that they first entered into to protect against 
rising interest rates. In other cases, even though interest rates have 
fallen, municipalities have found that floating payments have 
increased due to other market developments.145 
In Detroit’s case, the service corporations agreed to convert the 
floating rate of interest on certain of the COPs into a fixed 
payment.146  This was, according to Judge Rhodes, a wager by the 
City, because ‘‘if the floating interest rates exceeded a certain rate, 
the Swap Counterparties would make payments to the Service 
Corporations.  But if the floating interest rates sank below a certain 
rate, the Service Corporations would make payments to the Swap 
Counterparties.’’147  In addition to the risk that interest rate would 
move in a direction disadvantageous to the City, the City also was at 
risk if there was an ‘‘event of default’’ or ‘‘termination event,’’ 
                                                                                                                 
 142.  See Donohue, supra note 122. 
 143.  See MASSIMILIANO DE SANTIS, NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCS., 
DEMYSTIFYING FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: INTEREST RATE SWAPS AND MUNICIPAL 
DERIVATIVES 2 (2011), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1006&context=massi_de_santis. 
 144. Id. at 7. Among other risks, swaps carry counterparty credit risk, interest rate 
risk, and basis risk. NEIL O’HARA, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 249 
(6th ed. 2012); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MUNICIPAL SECURITIES: 
OVERVIEW OF MARKET STRUCTURE, PRICING AND REGULATION 51--52 (2012) 
(‘‘Termination risk is the risk that the swap may terminate or be terminated before its 
expiration. Swap agreements allow for termination of the swap by either party in the 
case of certain events, such as payment defaults on the swap or credit rating 
downgrades.  For example, if the issuer triggers early termination, it could owe a 
termination payment reflecting the value of the swap under the market conditions at 
that time.  If market rates have changed to the issuer’s disadvantage (e.g., the issuer is 
a fixed-rate payer and interest rates have declined), the issuer will be ‘out of the 
money’ on the swap, that is, the fixed rate that the issuer is paying to the counterparty 
is higher than the current market rate . . . . A termination of a swap can result in a 
substantial unexpected payment obligation.’’). 
 145.  DE SANTIS, supra note 143. 
 146. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 7. 
 147. Id. 
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according to Judge Rhodes.148  Judge Rhodes found that if either 
event occurred, ‘‘the Swap Counterparties could terminate the swaps 
and demand a potentially enormous termination payment.’’149 
In his Opinion Regarding Eligibility, Judge Rhodes found that due 
to a dramatic decline in interest rates in 2008, the City ‘‘lost 
catastrophically on the swaps bet.’’150  With respect to the POC-
related swaps, the City stated in its Comprehensive Annual Financial 
Report (CAFR) for the fiscal year ended June 2012 that ‘‘[a] total of 
$439.3 million of the negative fair value of derivatives are interest rate 
swaps associated with the City’s POCs.’’151  The CAFR also detailed 
consequences (termination fees, rating downgrades, etc.) that the City 
then was facing as a result of its difficulties meeting obligations 
associated with the POCs and swaps.152  As reported by Judge 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Id. at 8. 
 149. Id.  
 150. See id.  
 151. See CITY OF DETROIT FINANCE DEP’T, supra note 140, at 14. 
 152. Id. at 14, 33. According to the CAFR, 
    On January 8, 2009, due to POC debt rating and Swap Insurer’s rating 
declines, the City received formal notice from the Swap Counterparty to 
four of the eight Swap agreements stating that an event had occurred, which 
if not cured by the City, would constitute an Additional Termination Event.  
On January 14, 2009, the City also received formal notice from the Swap 
Counterparty to the four remaining Swap Agreements.  In June 2009, the 
City and the Counterparties agreed to an amendment to the Swap 
Agreements, thereby eliminating the Additional Termination Event and the 
potential for an immediate demand for payment to the Swap 
Counterparties.  As part of the amended Swap Agreements, the 
Counterparties waived their right to termination payments.  Additionally, 
the City was required to direct its Wagering Tax Revenues to a Trust as 
collateral for the quarterly payment to the Counterparties and agreed to 
other new termination events.  The termination events under the amended 
Swap Agreement include a provision for the Counterparties to terminate 
the amended Swap Agreement and demand a termination payment if POCs 
ratings are downgraded below ‘‘Ba3’’ or equivalent.  
    In March 2012, the risk of the amended Swap Agreement termination 
arose with the credit rating downgrade below ‘‘Ba3’’.  The amount of swap 
termination payments would be based upon a variety of factors such as the 
various Swap Counterparties’ financial pricing models, underlying variable 
debt, index or reference rates, and the point of pricing.  Any termination 
payments would be allocated based on the notional allocation percentage of 
the affected POCs, between the governmental and business-type activities 
as of the point of liability accrual.  If the termination events are not cured, 
there presently exists significant risk in connection with the City’s ability to 
meet the cash demands under the terms of the amended Swap Agreements.  
As of this report date, the City is negotiating with the counterparties to 
come up with an acceptable course of action due to the credit rating 
downgrade.  At June 30, 2012, the negative fair value of the POC swap 
2014] ZOMBIELAND 805 
Rhodes, ‘‘[t]he City estimates that the damage will be approximately 
$45,000,000 per year for the next ten years.’’153 
Detroit is not the only municipality to struggle with interest rate 
swaps.  In 1994, the relatively wealthy community of Orange County, 
California declared bankruptcy after a disastrous foray into the 
derivatives market.154  Fifteen years later, in 2009, Jefferson County, 
Alabama declared bankruptcy after federal authorities brought 
charges against the former mayor of Birmingham, Alabama, J.P. 
Morgan Securities, Inc. and two J.P. Morgan’s former managing 
directors in connection with an alleged illegal payment scheme 
whereby the managing directors funneled money to close friends of 
county commissioners to win bond offering business for J.P. Morgan 
Securities and to induce county officials to select J.P. Morgan’s 
affiliated bank as swaps provider.155  Due to the way Jefferson 
                                                                                                                 
liabilities was $354.7 million for the governmental activities and totaled 
$439.3 million for the primary government. 
Id. at 33. 
 153. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 8. 
 154.  For discussion of Orange County’s bankruptcy and threatened default, see 
generally Report of Investigation in the Matter of County of Orange, California as it 
Relates to the Conduct of the Members of the Board of Supervisors, Exchange Act 
Release No. 36761, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 24, 1996), 
http://www.sec.gov/info/municipal/mbonds/publicof.htm#PO1; see also Ann Judith 
Gellis, Municipal Securities Market: Same Problems-----No Solutions, 21 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 427, 454 (1996) (describing Orange County crisis and losses); Merton H. Miller & 
David J. Ross, The Orange County Bankruptcy and Its Aftermath: Some New 
Evidence, J. DERIVATIVES, Summer 1997, at 51--60.  For a brief discussion of market 
risk control failure and the Orange County situation, see Kimberly Krawiec, More 
than Just ‘‘New Financial Bingo’’: A Risk-Based Approach to Understanding 
Derivatives, 23 J. CORP. L. 1, 27--28 (1997) (citing Municipal Finance Issues: Hearings 
Concerning the Municipal Securities Market Before the House Comm. on 
Commerce, 105th Cong. 1995 (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC)). 
 155. See Press Release, SEC, J.P. Morgan Settles SEC Charges in Jefferson 
County, Ala. Illegal Payments Scheme, SEC Separately Charges Two Former 
Managing Directors at Firm (Nov. 4, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-232.htm; see also Mary Williams Walsh, 
Alabama Governor Fails to Prevent County’s Record $4 Billion Bankruptcy Filing, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/10/us/alabama-governor-
fails-to-prevent-jefferson-countys-record-4-billion-bankruptcy-filing.html?_r=0 
(reporting that at $4 billion, Jefferson County’s bankruptcy was then the largest in 
history, overtaking previous record (a $1.7 billion bankruptcy filing by Orange 
County, Calif. in December 1994)).  On April 30, 2008, the Commission charged 
Larry Langford (the then-mayor of Birmingham, Alabama and former president of 
the Jefferson County Commission) and certain industry professionals with securities 
fraud in connection with an alleged kick-back scheme involving the county’s efforts 
to finance improvements to its water and sewer systems, as required by 
environmental laws. Complaint at 8--33, SEC v. Langford, No. CV-08-B-0761-S (N.D. 
Ala. Apr. 30, 2008).  Langford also was charged in a parallel criminal case for 
allegedly sending more than $7 million in county bond business to an investment 
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County’s offerings and swaps transactions were structured, the annual 
payment on Jefferson County’s debt jumped from $53 million to $636 
million between 2008 and 2009.156  As debt obligations grew, and the 
county’s finances worsened,157 sewer taxes skyrocketed and public 
services were stripped to the bone.158  More recently, Oakland, 
California159 and the State of New Jersey160 (among others)161 
reportedly have wrestled with swap-related obligations.162 
                                                                                                                 
banker in return for bribes worth $241,843. Indictment, United States v. Langford, 
647 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2011).  On October 28, 2009, Langford was found guilty in a 
parallel criminal case on sixty counts of bribery, mail fraud, wire fraud, and tax 
evasion. See Langford, 647 F.3d at 1309, cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1121 (2012); see also 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Appeals Court Upholds Former Birmingham 
Mayor and Jefferson County Commission President’s Conviction, (Aug. 5, 2011), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/aln/News/August%202011/August%205,% 
202011%20County%20Commision.htm.  The Commission also brought related cases 
against J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. and two of its former managing directors in 
connection with the alleged scheme. See Complaint, SEC v. Charles LeCroy & 
Douglas McFaddin, No. CV-09-U-2238-S (N.D. Ala. Nov. 3, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/comp21280.pdf; JP Morgan Securities 
Inc., Securities Act Release No. 9078, Exchange Act Release No. 60928, 2009 WL 
3652405 (Nov. 4, 2009). 
 156.  See Matt Taibbi, Looting Main Street, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 31, 2010), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/looting-main-street-20100331.  On March 
3, 2009, certain of the county’s interest rate swap agreements were terminated. JP 
Morgan, 2009 WL 3652405, at *8.  ‘‘On March 6, 2009, J.P. Morgan Securities’ 
affiliated commercial bank notified the County that it owed $647,804,118.00 as the 
result of the termination of the Swap Agreements.’’ Id.  According to Jefferson 
County’s official budget for 2008--2009, budget revenues were $289 million. See 
JEFFERSON CNTY. BUDGET MANAGEMENT OFFICE, OFFICIAL OPERATING BUDGET 
JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA FISCAL YEAR OCTOBER 1, 2008--SEPTEMBER 20, 2009, 
at 55 (2008), available at http://jeffconline.jccal.org/Sites/Jefferson_County/ 
Documents/Budget%20Management%20Office/2009-Budget-BMO.pdf. 
 157.  Early in 2008, ratings agencies downgraded the County’s sewer bond insurers, 
and shortly thereafter, also downgraded the County’s approximately $3.2 billion of 
sewer bonds.  In February 2008, the auction market for the County’s auction-rate 
sewer bonds failed. See JEFFERSON CNTY, ALA., SEWER REVENUE WARRANTS: 
MATERIAL EVENT NOTICE 1--7 (2008), available at http://blog.al.com/bn/2008/02/ 
Material%20Event%20Notice-%20Sewer%20Bond%202-28-08.pdf; Shelly Sigo, 
Jefferson County Ala., Takes Sewer Rating Hit, BOND BUYER (Feb. 26, 2008), 
http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/117_36/-284135-1.html. 
 158.  See Taibbi, supra note 156. 
 159.  In 1998, Oakland reportedly issued variable rate bonds in order to help the 
city finance its pension obligations. See Oaklanders Demand End to Swap Ripoff, 
SEIU LOCAL 1021 (June 12, 2012), http://www.seiu1021.org/?s= 
Oakland%E2%80%99s+Goldman+Sachs+Rate+Swap&submit-btn=. To protect 
against interest rate spikes, the city entered into an agreement with Goldman Sachs 
to swap its variable rate for a fixed rate obligation. Id.  Instead of spiking, however, 
‘‘interest rates dropped to about half what the city was paying to Goldman Sachs.’’ Id.  
Although the bonds were refunded for additional debt in 2005, the swap agreement 
was structured to continue until 2021, and requires the city to pay $5 million per year 
until that time. Id.  Terminating the swap reportedly would cost Oakland $19 million. 
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d. Taxpayers Responsible in Ways that Shareholders Are Not 
In addition to the spending mandate and constrained sources of 
revenue, municipalities and their citizens also have fewer, less 
effective and more expensive monitoring and policing tools to 
manage borrowing and spending risk.163  In the private sector, 
                                                                                                                 
See id.; Aaron Lucchetti, Interest Rate Deals Sting Cities, States, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
22, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870377550457513593021132 
9798.html. 
 160.  See Jarrett Renshaw, N.J. Spends $122M to Partially Terminate Interest Rate 
Swap Deals in Past Month, NJ.COM (Feb. 9, 2011), 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/02/nj_spends_122m_to_partially_te.html 
(‘‘New Jersey spent more than $122 million last month to partially terminate eight 
interest-rate swap deals . . . . [T]he [New Jersey Economic Development] [A]uthority 
issued $1.1 billion in new bonds to cover the partial termination cost of eight swaps, 
as well as to refinance roughly $992 million worth of . . . bonds.  About $122 million 
of that borrowed money went to fees paid to Goldman Sachs, UBS and Deutsche 
Bank to terminate the swaps.’’); Letter from Robert Lamb, President, Lamont Inv. 
Advisers Corp., to James Petrino, N.J. Office of Pub. Fin. (Feb. 1, 2011), available at 
http://media.nj.com/ledgerupdates_impact/other/nj-swap-portfolio.pdf (attaching 
valuation report for details regarding the value of the outstanding swaps). 
 161.  See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Exotic Deals Put Denver Schools Deeper in 
Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/business/ 
06denver.html?pagewanted=all (detailing how and why the Denver School District 
entered into interest rate swap agreements and the eventual financial impact on the 
district); Press Release, Dep’t of the Auditor Gen., Philadelphia Derivatives Show 
Danger of Failure to Rein in Wall Street Penn. (Apr. 27, 2010), available at 
http://www.auditorgen.state.pa.us/department/press/phillyderivativesshowdangerfailr
eininwallstreet.html (detailing net negative values for interest rate swaps for the City 
of Philadelphia, the School District of Philadelphia, the Philadelphia Authority for 
Industrial Development, and the Philadelphia Intergovernmental Cooperation 
Authority).  Note that the constitutionality of school financing systems, while beyond 
the scope of this Article, has been litigated heavily over the years. See, e.g., Serrano 
v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).  In some cases, municipalities that have suffered 
losses due to swap agreements have sued their swap providers, often resulting in 
settlements or the restructuring of swap agreements.  In 2009, for example, the 
Alabama Public School and College Authority (APSCA) sued to void a swaption 
that it had sold to J.P. Morgan and refused to make payments on the swaption until a 
decision was rendered. See Shelly Sigo, Judge OKs Deal in Alabama, J.P. Morgan 
Swaption Suit, BOND BUYER (Dec. 27, 2010), http://www.bondbuyer.com/ 
issues/119_496/judge-okays-deal-in-alabama-1021520-1.html.  According to press 
reports, the APSCA agreed to pay a $19 million in settlement to J.P. Morgan to 
resolve the dispute. Id. 
 162. See Chung, supra note 34, at 1474--77; see also discussion in note 156 of the 
Jefferson County case. 
 163.  See, e.g., DEAN MICHAEL MEAD, GOV’T ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BUREAU, 
WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT YOUR LOCAL GOVERNMENT’S FINANCES: A 
GUIDE TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 2 (2d ed. 2011); Jerold L. Zimmerman, The 
Municipal Accounting Maze: An Analysis of Political Incentives, 15 J. ACCOUNTING 
RESEARCH 107 (1977).  For a discussion of limits of private ordering as a risk 
management tool in other contexts, see Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s 
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investors can decide if and when to invest in a particular corporation’s 
securities.  If an equity investor becomes unhappy, she may be able to 
express her displeasure in a variety of ways, including: (i) voting 
against incumbent board members during annual director elections, 
and proposing replacement slates of directors; (ii) making proposals 
during meetings and/or through the proxy system; and (iii) voting 
against major transactions proposed by incumbent boards and 
management.164 Corporate security holders also may use exit 
discipline-----i.e., selling securities-----to express disapproval. Certainly, 
there are variations in voting rights across security-types and across 
corporations.  Moreover, not every corporate security (debt or 
equity) is liquid or freely transferrable.  The power of the shareholder 
vote, and shareholders’ access to the proxy, also are limited in 
important respects.165  That said, because shareholder losses are 
generally limited to the amount of the shareholder’s investment, 
shareholder losses are capped even if the shareholder is unsuccessful 
in convincing the company to change course, and even if there are 
transaction costs associated with exit. 
With municipal securities, voter/taxpayers take the place of 
shareholders, and municipal officers take the place corporate officers 
and directors.  Once a taxpayer ‘‘buys in’’ to the municipal enterprise 
through the purchase of residential real estate or the use of municipal 
services, her choices are limited.166  She must pay government levies 
whether or not she agrees with a particular expenditure.  She may 
vote against bond offerings-----if the offering is subject to a vote-----but 
her point of view may not prevail, and opportunities to challenge 
issuances through litigation are limited.167  If she wishes to unseat 
                                                                                                                 
Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 569--572 
(2011) (examining limits of private ordering on risk shifting in derivatives markets). 
 164. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 211(b) (2004) (‘‘Unless directors are elected 
by written consent in lieu of an annual meeting as permitted by this subsection, an 
annual meeting of stockholders shall be held for the election of directors on a date 
and at a time designated by or in the manner provided in the by-laws.’’); id. § 212 
(referencing rights of ‘‘[e]ach stockholder entitled to vote at a meeting of 
stockholders or to express consent or dissent to a corporate action’’ to designate a 
proxy); id. § 216 (referencing number of shares required to constitute a quorum for 
voting purposes); id. § 251(c) (referencing shareholder voting rights with respect to 
merger/ consolidation); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2014) (shareholder proposals). 
 165. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (setting forth eligibility and procedural 
requirements for including a shareholder proposal in a corporation’s proxy 
materials). 
 166. See, e.g., MEAD, supra note 163, at 2; Gellis, supra note 115, at 59--61; 
Zimmerman, supra note 163. 
 167. According to Amurdsky & Gillette, ‘‘In recent years, courts and legislatures 
have restricted the ability of taxpayers to contest the issuance of municipal bonds.’’ 
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government officials responsible for particular offerings, she may 
have to wait until the next election (assuming the local officials 
behind the offering are elected) or pressure government officials to 
terminate appointed personnel.168  She also may have to deal with 
government structures that entrench existing managers and make it 
difficult for taxpayers to alter the composition of decision-making 
bodies.169  If the taxpayer is not happy with this state of affairs, she 
may be left with having to sell her real estate and move out of town.170  
Moving, however, is likely to involve significant transaction costs, 
especially when real estate markets are in turmoil. 
In Detroit’s case, with its diminished and impoverished population 
and rock-bottom property values, opportunities for policing and exit 
discipline may be even more limited and expensive than usual.  
Moreover, corruption-----and the inability of the ordinary citizen to 
rein in public officials’ malfeasance-----may have exacerbated Detroit’s 
distress.  On October 13, 2013, Detroit’s former mayor Kwame M. 
Kilpatrick was sentenced to twenty-eight years in prison after being 
convicted on dozens of counts racketeering and extortion, making 
him one of eighteen public officials convicted of corruption during his 
                                                                                                                 
AMURDSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 93, § 2.7.4, at 100.  As Amurdsky and Gillette 
explain, judicial review may be limited to specific issues, such as ‘‘(1) the regularity of 
the proceedings at which the bonds are issued; (2) the validity of the bonds; and (3) 
the legality of the purpose for which the bonds are issued.’’ Id. (citing Ward v. 
Commonwealth, 685 A.2d 1061, 1063 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996); see also City of 
Lubbock v. Isom, 615 S.W. 2d 171 (Tex. 1981) (holding challengers of city bond issues 
were barred from suing under Texas statute which provided that judicial decree 
validating bonds constituted permanent injunction against any action or proceeding 
contesting validity of bonds if no appeal taken in statutorily proscribed time frame). 
 168. As Professor Gellis points out, using the New York City bond crisis of the 
mid-1970s as an example, politicians may be incentivized to focus on the potential for 
short-term gains rather than the possibility of long-term costs or losses. Gellis, supra 
note 115, at 47--50.  This can lead to sub-optimal decision-making on issues relating to 
municipal finance. Id. 
 169. There is empirical research suggesting that certain governance structures may 
impact the likelihood and impact of restatements by municipal securities issuers.  
Professor Baber and his co-authors investigated the role of voter oversight in 
connection with accounting restatements in the municipal context and found that 
‘‘restatements are more likely, and the increase in debt financing costs following 
restatements are more substantial, when municipal managers are entrenched-----that 
is, when statutory provisions restrict the ability of voters to intervene directly in the 
municipal decision-making process or to quickly alter the composition of the city 
council.’’ WILLIAM R. BABER, ET AL., ACCOUNTING RESTATEMENTS, GOVERNANCE 
AND MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCING 29--30 (2011), available at 
http://www.centerforpbbefr.rutgers.edu/2012PBFEAM/papers/089-
Accounting%20Restatements,%20Governance,%20and%20Municipal%20Debt%20
Financing_William%20Baber_Aug.%202011.pdf. 
 170.  See, e.g., Gellis, supra note 115, at 59--61. 
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tenure.171  On December 24, 2013, banks involved in deals negotiated 
during Kilpatrick’s tenure reportedly agreed to compromise certain 
claims relating to interest rate swap transactions following mediation 
overseen by United States District Court Chief Judge Gerald Rosen 
and United States Bankruptcy Court Judge Elizabeth Perris.172  
According to the mediators’ recommendation, the agreement (if 
approved) would ‘‘allow[] the City to refinance its debt at more 
favorable terms, saving approximately $65 million from the original 
terms of the Forbearance Agreement, approximately $25 million at 
the time of the hearing on the assumption of the Agreement, and 
permitting the City to reduce its interim loan (commonly referred to 
as the DIP loan) by up to an additional $65 million.’’173  The mediators 
also argued that the proposed agreement would ‘‘further provide 
much needed financial flexibility by freeing up casino revenues held 
in the collateral account providing funds needed to maintain 
operations and bolster city services,’’ according to the mediators.174  
With respect to the SWAP counterparties, the mediators stated that 
the proposed agreement would ‘‘enable them to avoid the risk of 
losing all that they invested and further avoid the lawsuit the City 
threatened to bring which, if successful, could have forced them to 
disgorge and pay back to the City all of the payments they received 
under the swaps.’’175 
The proposed compromise between the City and SWAP 
counterparties was subject to court approval, and on January 16, 2014 
Judge Rhodes rejected it, reportedly stating that the proposed deal 
was ‘‘just too much money’’ for the City.176  Just two weeks later, the 
                                                                                                                 
 171. Steve Yaccino, Kwame M. Kilpatrick, Former Detroit Mayor, Sentenced to 28 
Years in Corruption Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/11/us/former-detroit-mayor-kwame-kilpatrick-
sentencing.html?_r=0; see also Indictment, United States v. Kilpatrick, No. CR-10-
200403-NGE (E.D. Mich.) (Dec. 15, 2010). 
 172. See Mediators’ Recommendation for Approval of Settlement Between the 
Debtor & SWAP Counter-Parties, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 
WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 2013); see also Brent Snavely & Joe 
Guillen, Detroit’s Retirement Systems to Challenge Renegotiated Swaps Settlement 
with Banks, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 26, 2013, 
http://www.freep.com/article/20131226/NEWS01/312260107/Retirement-systems-
bankruptcy-settlement. 
 173. Mediators’ Recommendation for Approval of Settlement Between the Debtor 
& SWAP Counter-Parties, supra note 172, at 2. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, Judge Disallows Plan by Detroit to Pay Off 
Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/16/judge-
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City filed a declaratory judgment action against service corporations 
and funding trusts involved in the COPs (as noted above, certain of 
Detroit’s swaps were connected to the COP transactions) seeking the 
entry of an order stating that all contractual obligations incurred by 
the City in connection with the COP transactions are ‘‘unenforceable 
and void ab initio.’’177  In a nutshell, the City’s complaint alleges that 
the service corporations and funding trusts formed in connection with 
the COP transactions swaps were a sham and an unlawful attempt to 
evade debt restrictions.178  This proceeding is pending as of the date of 
publication. 
D. Default and Discharge Options Limited 
1. Bankruptcy Is Complicated, Not a Get Out Of [Debtor] Jail Free 
Card 
Finally, constraints on default and discharge also make it difficult 
for cities (and thus their taxpayers) to obtain relief from debts.  As is 
clear from Detroit’s example, municipal bankruptcy operates very 
differently from individual and entity bankruptcy models.  While non-
state entities179 like Detroit may be able to seek bankruptcy 
protection under Chapter 9, there are meaningful eligibility 
requirements,180 involuntary bankruptcies are not permitted,181 
                                                                                                                 
rejects-detroits-deal-to-exit-swap-
contracts/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1. 
 177. Complaint of City of Detroit, Michigan for Declaratory Judgment & 
Injunctive Relief at 19, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 
(Jan. 31, 2014). 
 178. Id. at 18--19. 
 179. As constitutionally recognized sovereigns, states cannot declare or be forced 
into bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012) (failing to list states among the entities 
permitted to seek bankruptcy protection); id. § 903 (stating Chapter 9 ‘‘does not limit 
or impair the power of a State to control, by legislation or otherwise, a municipality 
of or in such State in the exercise of the political or governmental powers of the 
municipality, including expenditures for such exercise,’’ with two exceptions-----a state 
law prescribing a method of composition of municipal debt does not bind any non-
consenting creditor, nor does any judgment entered under such state law bind a 
nonconsenting creditor); id. § 904 (limiting the power of a bankruptcy court to 
‘‘interfere with-----(1) any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor; (2) 
any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or (3) the debtor’s use or enjoyment of 
any income-producing property’’ unless the debtor consents or the plan so provides). 
But see United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938) (holding that the federal 
government may grant bankruptcy relief to a state under Chapter 10 without 
violating the Constitution). 
 180. To be eligible for Chapter 9, an entity must meet the five criteria listed in 
§ 109(c). 11 U.S.C. § 109(c).  Specifically, the entity must 1) be a municipality, as 
defined by the Code; 2) be specifically authorized to be a bankruptcy debtor; 3) be 
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liquidation is not an option, and the issuer’s powers to operate (and 
thus make payments on debt) may not be affected.182  For example, 
because § 928 of the bankruptcy code provides that special revenues 
obtained by a municipal debtor after a bankruptcy filing are subject to 
liens granted prior to the bankruptcy filing,183 eligible ‘‘revenue 
bondholders are entitled to receive revenue pledged to them without 
any interference and on a timely basis.’’184  General obligation 
bondholders also may continue to receive payment following a 
Chapter 9 filing if the state statute authorizing the issuance contained 
a statutory lien.185  The bankruptcy code also provides that payments 
                                                                                                                 
insolvent as defined by § 101(32)(C); 4) genuinely desire to effect a plan to adjust its 
debts that exist as of the commencement of the case; and 5) satisfy one of the four 
alternative statutory requirements for negotiating with its creditors before filing its 
petition. Id.  The debtor bears the burden of establishing that it meets each of these 
statutory requirements. See, e.g., In re Cnty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 599 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 1995).  With respect to the ‘‘specifically authorized’’ criteria, fewer than half 
of the states authorize municipal bankruptcy petitions, assuming the filing 
municipality meets certain conditions. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-81-3 (LexisNexis 
2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-603 (2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-74-103 (2010); 
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53760 (2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-3903 (2013); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 66.400 (LexisNexis 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:4741, 39:619--620 
(2013); MINN. STAT. § 471.831 (2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 427.100 (West 2010); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 7-7-132 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-402 (2012); N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW 
§ 85.80 (McKinney 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 283 (West 2010); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 6-1-10 (2004); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 140.001 (West 2008); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 39.64.040 (2012).  Other states either prohibit municipal bankruptcy 
petitions or allow them only if the state approves the petition. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 7-566 (2013); FLA. STAT. § 218.01 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:619 
(2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1566 (West 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27-40 (West 
2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 23-48 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 133.36 (West 2012); 
53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5571 (2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-7 (2009).  Three states have 
enacted statutes providing limited authorization for specific municipal 
issuers/debtors. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-32-102 (2013) (taxing, drainage and 
irrigation districts); 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 320/9(b)(4) (West 2008) (power); 20 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 3855/1-20(b)(15); OR. REV. STAT. § 548.705 (West 2010) (drainage and 
irrigation districts). 
 181.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 904 (2012). 
 182.  For example, despite the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 
11 U.S.C. § 922(d) allows municipalities to continue paying pledged special revenue, 
or revenue bonds without obtaining the court’s permission or notifying other 
creditors. See id. § 922(d). By comparison, corporate reorganizations occur in the 
content of the potential liquidation of the debtor. See id. § 1123(a). 
 183.  See id. § 928. 
 184. See JAMES SPIOTTO, ET AL., MUNICIPALITIES IN DISTRESS? HOW STATES AND 
INVESTORS DEAL WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES 56 (2012). 
For a discussion of the legislative history of this provision, see id. at 54--56. 
 185. Id. at 58.  As Spiotto and his co-authors point out, this approach was used in 
the Orange County bankruptcy case, where the court held that the lien securing tax 
and revenue anticipate notes arising under state law was a statutory lien that survived 
the county’s Chapter 9 petition. Id. (citing In re Cnty. of Orange, 189 B.R. 499 (S.D. 
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received by holders of municipal bonds or note obligations within 
ninety days of the commencement of a municipal bankruptcy petition 
are not preferences subject to claw-back.186  Due to provisions like 
these, issuers may remain obligated to repay municipal bond debt 
despite seeking bankruptcy protection.187  At a minimum, as in 
Detroit’s case, these issues present knotty legal questions that cost 
time and money to resolve. 
Even when municipal bankruptcy (and debt adjustment) is 
available, it is not a ‘‘cure-all,’’ especially for taxpayers and public 
workers.  Even before debates over eligibility and debt priority 
erupted in the Detroit bankruptcy, for example, the bankruptcies in 
Vallejo, California and Jefferson County, Alabama highlighted costs 
associated with Chapter 9.  Vallejo, California filed for Chapter 9 
bankruptcy protection in May 2008 in the face of revenue constraints 
and expanding debt load, over the objections of public workers.188  
Although Vallejo’s bankruptcy filing gave the city breathing room to 
adjust debts owed to various creditor constituencies, respite came at a 
price.189  Through the bankruptcy process, the city adjusted 
                                                                                                                 
Cal. 1995)).  According to Spiotto, ‘‘at least thirty-two states recognize some form of 
a statutory lien in relation to their bond obligations.’’ Id. 
 186.  11 U.S.C. § 926 (2012). 
 187.  Some thirty states have laws in place that give holders of general obligations 
bonds and certain other securities issued by municipalities rights of first payment 
from certain revenue streams even during bankruptcy. See, e.g., SPIOTTO ET AL., 
supra note 184, at 54--55.  For a general discussion of municipal insolvency, see 
Alexander M. Laughlin, Municipal Insolvencies: An Article on the Treatment of 
Municipalities Under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, MUN. FIN. J., Summer 
2005, at 37--59. 
 188. See In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 432 B.R. 
262 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Carolyn Jones, Vallejo’s Bankruptcy Ends After 3 Tough 
Years, S.F. GATE (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f= 
/c/a/2011/11/01/BARI1LPAHN.DTL.  State and local governments have been 
battered by the subprime mortgage crisis and resulting economic downturn in a 
variety of ways in addition to those discussed here.  For example, the National 
Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States 
found that ‘‘losses on SIVs [structured investment vehicles] and other mortgage-
tainted investments also battered local government investment pools across the 
country, some of which held billions of dollars in these securities.’’ FIN. CRISIS 
INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF 
THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 254 (2011), available 
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. 
 189. See LEON R. BARSON ET AL., CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES: LEADING 
LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE CHAPTER 9 FILING PROCESS, COUNSELING 
MUNICIPALITIES, AND ANALYZING RECENT TRENDS AND CASES 9 (2011) (noting 
Chapter 9 filing gives distressed municipalities time-----and ‘‘breathing room’’-----to 
develop debt adjustment plans).  In In re City of Vallejo, the municipality sought to 
reject its collective bargaining agreements with public workers less than one month 
after filing its petition for relief under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 403 
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compensation and benefits packages with city workers, with the 
reported result that, ‘‘city staffers now contribute more to their health 
insurance, new firefighters have lower pension plans and the fire 
department no longer has minimum staffing requirements.’’190  
Although the city has emerged from bankruptcy, sales taxes remain 
high, public services remain ‘‘hollowed-out’’ and there are 
neighborhoods with dilapidated homes.191  City workers and taxpayers 
also have had to deal with approximately $8 million in legal fees that 
the city incurred in connection with the bankruptcy.192  According to 
press reports, however, Vallejo paid bondholders in full and on 
time.193  Likewise, in the Jefferson County case, county residents 
suffered lasting harm in the wake of the political corruption scheme, 
the default on municipal bonds associated with water and sewer 
improvement projects and, eventually, the County’s $4 billion 
bankruptcy filing.194  According to press reports, the county’s sewers 
still do not function properly, county services are operating at 
                                                                                                                 
B.R. at 72.  The court held that the less stringent standards for rejection of union 
contracts available under 11 U.S.C. § 365 and the Bildisco line of cases applied to 
Vallejo’s petition versus the more exacting standards for rejection of union contracts 
under 11 U.S.C. § 1113. See id. at 78 (applying the Bildisco standard for rejection of 
executor contracts, which permits a debtor to reject a collective bargaining agreement 
under 11 U.S.C. § 365 if it shows ‘‘1) the collective bargaining agreement burdens the 
estate; 2) after careful scrutiny, the equities balance favors contract rejection; and 3) 
‘reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary modification have been made, and are 
not likely to produce a prompt and satisfactory solution.’’’ (citing NLRB. v. Bildisco 
& Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 526 (1984))). 
 190. See Jones, supra note 188. Fire and police unions had opposed Vallejo’s 
bankruptcy filing on the grounds that the city used bankruptcy strategically as a 
means of avoiding contractual obligations respecting benefits. Id. 
 191. See, e.g., White, supra note 129 (discussing tax increases and reductions in 
public services in Vallejo, California after the city declared bankruptcy in 2008 in the 
face of declining revenues, soaring costs and municipal bond-related obligations). 
 192. Id. Among other reasons for the legal fees, the city and certain of its public 
workers engaged in extensive litigation over whether the bankruptcy filing was 
necessary, or whether it was means of avoiding collective bargaining obligations. See 
Opposition to Debtor’s Application for Order Setting June 9 Deadline for Filing 
Objections to Petition, In re City of Vallejo, No. 08-26813 (MSM) (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 
May 28, 2008). 
 193. Patrick McGee, Vallejo Shows the Way, BOND BUYER (Feb. 28, 2001), 
http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/120_40/vallejo_muni_bankruptcy-1023803-1.html. 
According to Hildreth and Zorn, the San Jose School District in California also paid 
its debt service on schedule despite seeking bankruptcy protection in 1983 ‘‘due, in 
part, to Proposition 13 tax limits, but, more pointedly, to void a labor arbitration 
award.’’ Hildreth & Zorn, supra note 97, at 145. 
 194.  As noted, I discuss the Jefferson County case in my previously published 
work, Chung, supra note 34, at 1474--77. 
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skeleton crew levels, and the debt still exists.195  As one county 
resident reportedly said, ‘‘Everyone wonders how the county will ever 
get out of this financial mess.’’196 
a. Default, Discharge and Bailouts Are Disfavored for Political 
Reasons, Too. 
Political realities also limit municipalities’ access to debt relief.  In 
some cases, local government issuers may not reach the point of 
default or bankruptcy because the state steps in and takes control.  As 
Massachusetts Representative Barney Frank explained in 2008 during 
Congressional hearings on turmoil in the municipal bond market: 
 No State, no State legislators, no governor, can allow any one of 
its municipalities to default because then every other municipality 
would pay through the nose. So that is why this is not just some 
charity here; this is self-defense. 
 The particular municipality, you might pity the municipal 
workers there. Services may get cut back. Maybe the trash won’t get 
picked up. But we can guarantee you, we have all been there, you 
can’t do that [default]. Because if any one municipality falters, every 
municipality in that State would pay, and there isn’t a State governor 
and legislature in the country who doesn’t understand that, and 
that’s why the State guarantee is such a good one.197 
Similarly, as the Securities and Exchange Commission observed in 
one of its reports on the municipal securities market, bankruptcy 
generally is a last resort for distressed municipalities: 
The low number of bankruptcies in the municipal sector can be 
attributed to several factors, both legal and practical, including: the 
negative effects of a bankruptcy filing on the credit ratings not only 
of the municipalities themselves, but also the states in which they are 
located, which means that bankruptcy is often used only as a last 
resort; the public nature of bankruptcy; state restrictions against 
filing under Chapter 9; and the negative effects on access to future 
                                                                                                                 
 195.  Walsh, supra note 128 (noting that public services in Jefferson County, 
Alabama were gutted after the county declared bankruptcy in 2011 in the wake of a 
corruption scandal tied to more than $1 billion in municipal bond debt and related 
interest rate swaps).  New Jersey also has faced considerable turmoil in its efforts to 
deal with the fiscal problems exposed by the case against it. See, e.g., State Budgets: 
The Day of Reckoning, CBS NEWS (Dec. 19, 2010), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/state-budgets-the-day-of-reckoning/1. 
 196. Walsh, supra note 128.  As noted, Detroit is not alone in this.  See 
Lowenstein, supra note 129; Varghese, supra note 126; White, supra note 129. 
 197.  Municipal Bond Turmoil: Impact on Cities, Towns, and States: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 25 (2008) (statement of Rep. 
Barney Frank, Chairman, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.). 
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capital markets, which motivates financially distressed municipalities 
to rely on mechanisms other than Chapter 9 (including state 
refinancing authorities, receiverships, and commissions) to 
restructure debt.198 
‘‘States that intervene often want to avoid the stigma that would 
come from their cities filing for bankruptcy protection,’’199 as well as 
reduce impacts on other municipalities within the state associated 
with contagion.200  In Vallejo, California, for example, the city 
reportedly was not able to access public debt markets for three years 
during its bankruptcy (2008-2011) for money to maintain its streets or 
replace its aging police cars and fire trucks.201  In addition, after the 
city made extensive cuts to its police and fire fighter forces, crime 
rates rose, as did response times to fire and medical emergencies.202  
Declines in quality of life in the city-----which made the national 
news-----caused Vallejo to lose a portion of its population even as cities 
in the area gained residents.203  Concerns about contagion also have 
merit. In the wake of Detroit’s filing, other Michigan municipalities 
reportedly were forced to delay planned offerings. 204 
b. Cuts . . . A Drop in the Bucket, Significant Harm to Public Life 
Finally, while budget cuts may be an important tool in solving 
municipal fiscal crisis, Detroit’s example suggests that cities in 
financial extremis cannot ‘‘cut’’ their way to solvency.  According to 
its bankruptcy filings, Detroit already has sought to reduce expenses 
through measures such as employee headcount reductions.205  These 
cuts have ‘‘gutted many City departments, resulting in the deferral of 
many necessary investments and decreasing level of services to 
Detroiters,’’ according to Emergency Manager Orr.206  They also have 
contributed to a negative feedback loop in Detroit whereby taxes on 
                                                                                                                 
 198.  SEC, supra note 109, at 24--25 (citations omitted). 
 199. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
FINANCIAL DISTRESS 14 (2013), available at http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/ 
PCS_Assets/2013/Pew_State_Role_in_Local_Government_Financial_Distress.pdf. 
 200. Id. at 16. 
 201. Id. at 14. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See, e.g., Bloomberg News, Battle Creek Becomes Second Michigan 
Municipality to Delay Bond Aale, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (Aug. 6, 2013), 
http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20130806/NEWS01/130819889/battle-creek-
becomes-second-michigan-municipality-to-delay-bond-sale. 
 205. Orr Declaration, supra note 1, at 46. 
 206. Id. at 22. 
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those who must remain are unsustainable, even as the City’s 
inadequate public infrastructure and services and high tax rates 
threaten to drive people and business away. 
II. KEY LEGAL QUESTIONS: PENSIONER RIGHTS, BONDHOLDER 
RIGHTS, AND TAXPAYER RIGHTS 
Against this backdrop of hard choices and competition for meager 
resources, Detroit’s bankruptcy presents two key legal questions: 1) 
Can Detroit use Chapter 9 bankruptcy proceedings to reduce or 
restructure accrued pension benefits of retired city workers when the 
Michigan Constitution states that ‘‘[t]he accrued financial benefits of 
each pension plan and retirement system of the state and its political 
subdivisions shall be a contractual obligation thereof which shall not 
be diminished or impaired thereby’’207 and also states that 
‘‘[n]o . . . law impairing the obligations of contract shall be 
enacted?’’208 2) How will debts associated with Detroit’s municipal 
securities-----and particularly its UTGO-----be dealt with, when (i) 
Detroit is already levying taxes at or near statutory maximums; (ii) 
City residents cannot absorb taxes increases, and (ii) Detroit does not 
have (and will not have, without restructuring) sufficient funds to pay 
its debts? 
In the following subpart, I discuss legal questions surrounding 
pension impairment in Part A, and issues relating to Detroit’s UTGO 
bonds in Part B. 
A. Can Detroit Use Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Proceedings to 
Reduce or Restructure Accrued Pension Rights of Retired City 
Workers, Given Michigan Constitution Pension Clause? 
On December 5, 2013, Judge Steven Rhodes held that Detroit is 
eligible to be a Chapter 9 debtor despite the fact that neither the City 
nor the State explicitly carved out accrued pension benefits and 
protected them from adjustment.209  Judge Rhodes also held that 
accrued pension benefits are subject to impairment in Chapter 9 
proceedings, despite the Pension Clause.210  In the following section, I 
discuss the debate surrounding pension impairment and Judge 
Rhodes’s ruling. 
                                                                                                                 
 207. MICH. CONST., art IX, § 24. 
 208. MICH. CONST., art I, § 10. 
 209. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1. 
 210. Id. 
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1. The Emergency Manager Puts Pension Impairment on the Table. 
Pension impairment has been a hot button issue in the Detroit 
bankruptcy ever since June 14, 2013, when the Office of the 
Emergency Manager published a proposal to the City’s creditors 
which referenced adjusting pension obligations.211  In his proposal, 
Orr outlined Detroit’s dire financial condition and called for a 
‘‘thorough overhaul and restructuring’’ of the City’s obligations.212  
Among other initiatives, the June 14 proposal outlined the City’s 
plans to invest $1.25 billion over ten years to improve basic and 
essential City services such as police, fire and EMS.213  The June 14 
proposal also outlined the City’s intention to expand its income and 
property tax bases, rationalize and adjust income tax rates, and 
improve tax and fee collection efforts.214 
With respect to creditor recoveries, Orr proposed the following: (i) 
‘‘treatment of secured debt commensurate with the value of the 
collateral securing such debt, including the repayment or refinancing 
of the City’s revenue bonds, secured unlimited and limited tax general 
obligation bonds, secured installment notes and liabilities arising in 
connection with swap obligations;’’215 (ii) ‘‘pro rata distribution of 
$2,000,000,000 in principal amount of interest-only limited recourse 
participation notes to holders of unsecured claims,’’ including holders 
of unsecured limited and unlimited tax general obligation bonds, the 
service corporations (based on the COPs), the pension systems (based 
on pension underfunding), and retirees (based on OPEB);216 and (iii) 
‘‘[a] ‘Dutch Auction’ process for the City to purchase the notes.’’217  
Also at the meeting respecting the June 14 proposal, Orr announced 
his decision to not make the scheduled $39,700,000 in payments due 
on the COPs and swap transactions.218 
With respect to claims for unfunded pension liabilities, Orr stated 
that ‘‘[b]ecause the amounts realized on the underfunding claims will 
be substantially less than the underfunding amount, there must be 
                                                                                                                 
 211. See id. at 18; see also OFFICE OF CITY MANAGER, supra note 124; PROPOSAL 
FOR CREDITORS, supra note 3. 
 212. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 18; see also OFFICE OF CITY 
MANAGER, supra note 124; PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS, supra note 3. 
 213. See PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS, supra note 3, at 61--78 app. J. 
 214. Id. at 79--82. 
 215. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 18 (citing PROPOSAL FOR 
CREDITORS, supra note 3, at 101--09). 
 216. Id. at 19 (citing PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS, supra note 3, at 101--09). 
 217. Id. (citing PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS, supra note 3, at 108). 
 218. See id. 
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significant cuts in accrued, vested pension amounts for both active 
and currently retired persons.’’219  In subsequent comments, Orr 
acknowledged the Pension Clause of the Michigan Constitution, but 
reportedly suggested that neither it nor the Contracts Clause 
prevented a bankruptcy court from impairing pensions as part of a 
plan of adjustment under Chapter 9.220 
2. Retirees Initially Seek Refuge in State Court 
On July 3, 2013, with the possibility of impairment on the table, 
petitioners filed two separate lawsuits in state court seeking a 
declaratory judgment that Public Act 436 (the Act pursuant to which 
Orr was appointed) violated the Michigan Constitution to the extent 
that it purported to authorize Chapter 9 proceedings without first 
carving out (or otherwise ring-fencing) accrued pension benefits to 
protect them from adjustment.221  The petitioners also sought an 
injunction preventing defendants from authorizing any Chapter 9 
proceeding in which vested pension benefits might be impaired.222  
Shortly thereafter, the Detroit pensions systems filed a similar 
lawsuit.223 
On July 18, 2013, the Ingham County Circuit Court found that 
Chapter 9 for Detroit would impair accrued financial benefits in 
violation of the Pension Clause.224  The court entered a preliminary 
injunction enjoining officials from taking further action on behalf of 
the City through a Chapter 9 proceeding where pension benefits 
might be impaired.225  One day later, the court issued a declaratory 
judgment order holding that accrued pension benefits could not be 
impaired under the Michigan Constitution, and also made the 
                                                                                                                 
 219. OFFICE OF CITY MANAGER, supra note 124, at 56; see also PROPOSAL FOR 
CREDITORS, supra note 3, at 109. 
 220. See, e.g., Q & A with Kevyn Orr: Detroit’s Emergency Manager Talks About 
City’s Future, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 16, 2013, http://www.freep.com/article/ 
20130616/OPINION05/306160052/kevyn-orr-detroit-emergency-manager-creditors-
fiscal-crisis; Ed White, Detroit to Get Crucial Ruling in Bankruptcy Case, YAHOO! 
NEWS (Dec. 13, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/detroit-crucial-ruling-bankruptcy-case-
061034373-----finance.html.  
 221. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, Flowers v. Snyder, No. 13-729-CZ (Mich. Cir. 
Ct. July 8, 2013); Complaint, Webster v. Michigan, No. 13-734-CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 
3, 2013). 
 222. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 221. 
 223. Complaint, Gen. Retirement Syst. of the City of Detroit v. Orr, No. 13-768-
CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 17, 2013). 
 224. Preliminary Injunction, Webster v. State, No. 13-734-CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 
18, 2013). 
 225. Id. 
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following rulings: (i) ‘‘PA 436 is unconstitutional and in violation 
of . . . [the Pension Clause,] to the extent it permits the Governor to 
authorize an emergency manager to proceed under Chapter 9 in any 
manner which threatens to impair or diminish accrued pension 
benefits;’’ (ii) ‘‘[t]he Governor is prohibited by . . . [the Pension 
Clause] from authorizing an emergency manager under PA 436 to 
proceed under Chapter 9 in a manner which threatens to diminish or 
impair accrued pension benefits;’’ and (iii) ‘‘[b]y authorizing [] 
Emergency Manager [Orr] to proceed under Chapter 9 to diminish or 
impair accrued pension benefits, [the Governor] acted without 
authority under Michigan law and in violation of . . . [the Pension 
Clause].226 
3. The Debate Moves to Bankruptcy Court 
This City’s bankruptcy filing moved the debate to bankruptcy 
court.  On July 16, 2013, Emergency Manager Orr recommended to 
Michigan governor Richard Snyder and to the state’s treasurer that 
the City file for Chapter 9 relief.227  On July 18, the same day the state 
court issued its judgment, Governor Snyder authorized the City to file 
a Chapter 9 petition.228  Although section 141.15661(1) of the 
Michigan Compiled Laws purports to permit the governor to ‘‘place 
contingencies on a local government in order to proceed under 
chapter 9,’’229 Governor Snyder did not do so.  Instead, Governor 
Snyder explained that he was ‘‘choosing not to impose any such 
contingencies today.  Federal law already contains the most important 
contingency-----a requirement that the plan be legally executable.’’230  
                                                                                                                 
 226. See Order of Declaratory Judgment, Webster v. State, No. 13-734-CZ (Mich. 
Cir. Ct. July 19, 2013). 
 227. See Letter from Kevin D. Orr, Emergency Manager, City of Detroit, Mich., to 
Richard Snyder, Governor, State of Mich. & Andrew Dillon, Treasurer, State of 
Mich. (July 16, 2013), in Orr Declaration, supra note 1 (attached as Exhibit J). 
 228. Letter from Richard D. Snyder, Governor, State of Mich. to Kevyn Orr, City 
Manager, City of Detroit, Mich. & Andrew Dillon, State Treasurer, State of Mich. 
(July 18, 2013), in Orr Declaration, supra note 1 (attached as Exhibit K) (citation 
omitted). 
 229. MICH. COMP. LAW § 141.1558(1) (2013); see Letter from Richard D. Snyder, 
Governor, State of Mich. to Kevyn Orr, City Manager, City of Detroit, Mich. & 
Andrew Dillon, State Treasurer, State of Mich. 4 (July 18, 2013), in Orr Declaration, 
supra note 1 (attached as Exhibit K). 
 230. Letter from Richard D. Snyder, Governor, State of Mich. to Kevyn Orr, City 
Manager, City of Detroit, Mich. & Andrew Dillon, State Treasurer, State of Mich. 4 
(July 18, 2013), in Orr Declaration, supra note 1 (attached as Exhibit K). 
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Orr filed the City’s Chapter 9 petition that same day.231  After the 
bankruptcy court entered an order staying pre-petition litigation 
(including the state court actions), more than one hundred parties 
(including pensioners and other stakeholders) (hereinafter, 
collectively, the Objectors) filed objections to Detroit’s eligibility in 
the bankruptcy court action.232 
Citing the Pension Clause, public worker stakeholders argued that 
Detroit is not eligible to be a Chapter 9 debtor because the State (and 
the City) failed explicitly to protect accrued pension benefits from 
impairment.233  Among other arguments, these Objectors asserted 
that (i) Chapter 9 is unconstitutional on its face under the Bankruptcy 
Clause of Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution 
because it violates the uniformity requirement, and under the 
Contracts Clause of Article I, Section 10 to the extent it would permit 
the impairment of contracts to which the state is a party; and (ii) 
Chapter 9 is unconstitutional as applied under the Tenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution to the extent it does not prohibit the 
bankruptcy court from impairing vested pension benefits owed to 
Detroit’s retired city workers.234 
                                                                                                                 
 231. See Bankruptcy Petition, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 
6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 18, 2013). 
 232. Order Pursuant to Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code Confirming the 
Protections of Sections 362, 365 and 922 of the Bankruptcy Code, In re City of 
Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 25, 2013); 
see Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that 109 parties filed 
timely objections).  As to federalism issues associated with the state court rulings, 
Judge Rhodes held that the Ingham County court’s judgment respecting was not 
binding under principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel, and also is not a 
persuasive indication of what the Michigan Supreme Court would hold.  See id. at 
55--56. 
 233. See, e.g., Objection of the Official Committee of Retirees to Eligibility of the 
City of Detroit, Michigan to Be A Debtor Under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 
19, 2013). 
 234. Id. As summarized by the bankruptcy court, 110 separate creditors filed 
objections to Detroit’s eligibility on various grounds, raising the following legal 
questions: 
1. Does chapter 9 of the bankruptcy code violate the uniformity 
requirement of the bankruptcy clause of the United States Constitution?[;] 
2. Does chapter 9 violate the contracts clause of the United States 
Constitution?[;] 3. Does chapter 9 violate the Tenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, as applied in this case?[;] 4. Does the 
bankruptcy court have the authority to determine the constitutionality of 
chapter 9 of the bankruptcy code under Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 
(2011)?[;] 5. Did the voters’ rejection of Michigan Public Act 4 of 2011 in 
November 2012 constitutionally prohibit the Michigan Legislature from 
enacting Michigan Public Act 436 of 2012?[;] 6. Does Public Act 436 violate 
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4. Judge Rhodes’s Opinion Regarding Eligibility 
On December 5, 2013, following extensive briefing and hearings, 
Judge Rhodes issued a 143-page ruling respecting Detroit’s eligibility 
for Chapter 9 relief.235  After cataloging Detroit’s debts and the 
impact of the City’s financial crisis on the City’s beleaguered 
residents, Judge Rhodes observed that a plan of adjustment may be 
Detroit’s only hope for survival: 
 The City of Detroit was once a hardworking, diverse, vital city, 
the home of the automobile industry, proud of its nickname-----the 
‘‘Motor City.’’  It was rightfully known as the birthplace of the 
American automobile industry.  In 1952, at the height of its 
prosperity and prestige, it had a population of approximately 
1,850,000 residents.  In 1950, Detroit was building half of the world’s 
cars. 
 The evidence before the Court establishes that for decades, 
however, the City of Detroit has experienced dwindling population, 
employment, and revenues.  This has led to decaying infrastructure, 
                                                                                                                 
the Michigan Constitution because it included appropriations provisions for 
the purpose of evading the right of referendum?[;] 7. Does Public Act 436 
violate the home rule provisions of the Michigan Constitution?[;]  8. Does 
Public Act 436 violate the pension clause of the Michigan Constitution?[;] 9. 
Does the pension clause of the Michigan Constitution establish protections 
for pension rights that are greater than contract rights?[;] 10. Does the 
bankruptcy court have the authority to determine the constitutionality of 
Public Act 436 under Stern v. Marshall?[;] 11. Did Detroit’s emergency 
manager have valid authority to file this bankruptcy case even though he is 
not an elected official?[;] 12. Was the governor’s authorization to file this 
bankruptcy case valid under the Michigan Constitution even though the 
authorization did not prohibit the City from impairing pension rights?[;] 13. 
Does the judgment in Webster v. Michigan, which was entered post-
petition, preclude the City from asserting that the governor’s authorization 
to file this bankruptcy case was valid?[;] 14. Was the City ‘‘insolvent’’ under 
11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C), as required by 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3)?[;] 15. Does the 
City desire to effect a plan to adjust its debts, as required by 11 U.S.C. § 
109(c)(4)?[;] 16. Did the City negotiate with its creditors in good faith 
before filing its bankruptcy petition, as required (in the alternative) by 11 
U.S.C. § 109(c)(5)(B)?[;] 17. Was the City unable to negotiate with creditors 
because such negotiation was impracticable, as required (in the  alternative) 
by 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5)(C)?[; and] 18. Should the case be dismissed under 
11 U.S.C. § 921(c) because the City of Detroit did not file its bankruptcy 
petition in good faith? 
Memorandum Regarding: I. Certification Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A)(i) II. 
Recommendation on Whether Direct Appeals Should Be Authorized And III. 
Parties’ Request to Recommend Expedited Consideration of Appeals at 6--7, In re 
City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 20, 
2013). 
 235. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1. 
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excessive borrowing, mounting crime rates, spreading blight, and a 
deteriorating quality of life. 
 The City no longer has the resources to provide its residents with 
the basic police, fire and emergency medical services that its 
residents need for their basic health and safety. 
 Moreover, the City’s governmental operations are wasteful and 
inefficient. Its equipment, especially its streetlights and its 
technology, and much of its fire and police equipment, is obsolete. 
To reverse this decline in basic services, to attract new residents and 
businesses, and to revitalize and reinvigorate itself, the City needs 
help.236 
Having framed the case in this fashion, Judge Rhodes held that 
Detroit meets the criteria set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) and is eligible 
to be a Chapter 9 debtor.237  With respect to pension impairment, 
Judge Rhodes rejected the Objectors’ claim that the City was 
required to carve out pensions as a condition to Chapter 9 
eligibility.238  Among other specific holdings239 Judge Rhodes 
                                                                                                                 
 236. Id. at 4.  Notably, during hearings on the Objections to Eligibility, Judge 
Rhodes said (with respect to the Pensions Clause), 
The question we all are struggling with is what is the meaning-----the 
substantive meaning-----of that provision in the context of a political 
subdivision that doesn’t have the money to comply with it?  What’s the 
meaning of it?  How do we give meaning to non-impairment . . . if the city 
doesn’t have the money to pay? 
Hearing on Eligibility Objections at 41:19, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 
2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 15-16, 2013), available at 
http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/apps/detroit/DetroitAudio.cfm.  Judge Rhodes raised 
this theme repeatedly during arguments, questioning lawyer after lawyer about what 
the Pension Clause guarantee means if Detroit does not have the money to meet its 
pension-related obligations in full, or if meeting those obligations in full (were it even 
possible) would mean the City was unable to make the kind of investments in 
infrastructure, services and the living conditions generally necessary to put the City 
on a path towards recovery. See, e.g., id. at 2:45:47--2:48:00. 
 237. See generally Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1. 
 238. Id. at 41--44. 
 239. Id. Other holdings not discussed in this Article include the following: (a) the 
bankruptcy court has the authority to determine the constitutionality of Chapter 9 
and Michigan Public Act 436, see id. at 22--26; (b) Michigan Public Act 436 does not 
violate the Michigan Constitution, see id. at 45--52; (c) Detroit’s Emergency Manager 
had valid authority to file the bankruptcy case even though he is not an elected 
official, see id. at 52; (d) the Governor’s authorization to file the bankruptcy case was 
valid under the Michigan Constitution even though the authorization did not prohibit 
the City from impairing pension rights, see id. at 52--53; (e) the judgment in the 
Webster state court action does not preclude the City from asserting that the 
Governor’s authorization to file the bankruptcy case was valid, see id. at 53--59; (f) 
Detroit was insolvent, see id. at 59--62; (g) the City desires to effect a plan to adjust its 
debts, see id. at 62--64; (g) the City did not negotiate in good faith with creditors, see 
id. at 64--68; (h) the City filed its bankruptcy petition in good faith, see id. at 71--81; 
824 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLI 
concluded that (a) Chapter 9 is not facially unconstitutional under the 
Bankruptcy Clause of Article I, Section 8 or the Contracts Clause of 
Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution;240 (b) Chapter 
9 does not violate the Tenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution;241 and (c) Chapter 9 is constitutional as applied in this 
case despite the failure to ring-fence pensions.242  The following 
section discusses the parties’ arguments, and the court’s rulings, on 
the pension impairment issue. 
a. Objectors Have Standing, Dispute Is Ripe For Adjudication243 
As a preliminary matter, Judge Rhodes rejected claims that the 
Objectors lacked standing, and that their claims were not yet ripe for 
adjudication.244  In pre-hearing papers, the United States and the City 
argued that the Objectors’ claims respecting pension impairment 
ought to be addressed at the plan confirmation state (and only then if 
the City proposed a plan of adjustment calling for impairment) 
because only then would the court know if (and how) the City sought 
to impair accrued pension benefits.245  Citing the Pension Clause, the 
Emergency Manager’s June 14 proposal and statements regarding 
court’s power to impair pension rights, the Governor’s authorization, 
and the City’s petition, the Objectors argued that that they had 
standing, and that their dispute was ripe for adjudication, on the 
theory that filing a petition without ring-fencing pension was itself an 
impairment, and an injury in fact. 246 
                                                                                                                 
and (i) the Supreme Court’s decision in Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection does not apply in this case. 474 U.S. 494 
(1986); see id. at 82. 
 240. Id. at 28. 
 241. Id. at 28--29, 32--44. 
 242. Id. at 40--44. 
 243. Although the court addressed standing and ripeness in the context of his 
Tenth Amendment analysis ‘‘because the United States and the City framed this issue 
in the context of the Tenth Amendment challenge to chapter 9 of the bankruptcy 
code,’’ the court observed that ‘‘the same considerations would apply and would lead 
to the same conclusion’’ to the extent that standing and ripeness arguments were 
made respecting the other constitutional challenges presented by Objectors’ papers.  
Id. at 29 n.19.  Consequently, I have addressed standing and ripeness first, and they 
are typically threshold issues. 
 244. Id. 
 245. See, e.g., United States of America’s Memorandum in Support of 
Constitutionality of Chapter 9 of Title 11 of the United States Code at 16--18, In re 
City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 11, 
2013); see also Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 29--32. 
 246. See, e.g., The Michigan Council 25 of the American Federation of State, 
County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO and Sub-Chapter 98, City of Detroit 
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In his Opinion Regarding Eligibility, Judge Rhodes found in favor 
of Objectors as to both standing and ripeness.  With respect to 
standing, Judge Rhodes held that the Objectors ‘‘who are creditors 
with pension claims against the City’’ are parties in interest, and thus 
have standing to assert their constitutional arguments as part of the 
bankruptcy case.247  With respect to ripeness, the court held that the 
Objectors’ challenge to Detroit’s eligibility is not an ‘‘abstract 
disagreement ungrounded in the here and now.’’248  Rather, the 
dispute ‘‘arises in the concrete factual context of the City of Detroit 
filing this bankruptcy case under chapter 9 of the bankruptcy code 
and the objecting parties challenging the constitutionality of that very 
law.’’249  In so holding, Judge Rhodes rejected arguments that the 
Objectors’ injury was not yet ‘‘imminent’’ because the city had not yet 
filed a plan of adjustment outlining the precise contours of 
impairment.250 
Notably, Judge Rhodes cited ‘‘judicial prudence’’ and a desire to 
expedite proceedings as additional support for his rulings respecting 
ripeness and standing. 251  Judge Rhodes has made it clear throughout 
these proceedings that he is anxious for the City’s stakeholders to 
come together, if possible, to chart a course forward for the City: for 
example, Judge Rhodes has directed parties to mediation, stating 
‘‘years of litigation, disputing issues in the courts,’’ would be 
‘‘horrendous’’ for the City.252  In the Opinion Regarding Eligibility, 
Judge Rhodes reasoned that addressing constitutional issues 
                                                                                                                 
Retirees’ Objection to the City of Detroit’s Eligibility to Obtain Relief Under 
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code at 33--38, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-
53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2013) [hereinafter AFSCME 
Objection to Eligibility]; see also Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 29--
32. 
 247. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 30. 
 248. See id. at 31 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967)). 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 30--32. 
 251. Id. at 31. 
 252. See, e.g., Detroit Attempts to Reach Bankruptcy Settlement in Mediation 
with Creditors, GUARDIAN (Sep. 17, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2013/sep/17/detroit-bankruptcy-settlement-creditors. Since issuing his opinion 
regarding eligibility, Judge Rhodes has continued to direct litigants to mediation; See 
also Order to Certain Parties to Appear for Continued Mediation On DWSD 
Matters, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. Dec. 31, 2013); Order to Certain Parties to Appear for Continued Mediation 
on UTGO Matters, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 2103); Order to Certain Parties to Appear for Continued 
Mediation on LTGO Matters, In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 
6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 2103). 
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surrounding the Pension Clause at the eligibility stage (rather than 
waiting until the City presents a plan for confirmation) would permit 
the court and the parties to focus on whether the City’s ultimate plan 
meets the confirmation requirements of the bankruptcy code.253  
While the court might have postponed consideration on ripeness 
grounds in particular, addressing the relationship between Chapter 9 
and the Michigan Constitution at the eligibility likely will influence 
the parties’ willingness (and ability) to negotiate respecting an 
adjustment plan: after all, if the court had held that accrued pension 
benefits were off the table entirely, public workers would have little 
incentive to negotiate and/or compromise.  The court’s early ruling on 
impairment is thus consistent with Judge Rhodes’ efforts to bring the 
parties to the table to forge a compromise. 
B. Chapter 9 Is Not Facially Unconstitutional 
1. Chapter 9 Does Not Violate the Uniformity Clause or the 
Contracts Clause 
In pre-hearing papers, certain of the Objectors (principally the 
union AFSCME) argued that Chapter 9 is unconstitutional on its face 
because it ‘‘ced[es] to each state the ability to define its own 
qualifications for a municipality to declare bankruptcy’’ and thus 
permits the ‘‘promulgation of non-uniform bankruptcies.’’254  The 
potential for non-uniformity is particularly acute in states like 
Michigan, according to AFSCME, because Michigan law (i.e., Public 
Act 436) allows the governor to attach contingencies to authorization 
for a Chapter 9 petition.255 
For its part, the City argued that the uniformity rule prevents 
Michigan from conditioning Detroit’s entry into bankruptcy on a 
promise to ring-fence pensions.  The City argued that Chapter 9’s 
framework was ‘‘well established’’ when Michigan’s Pension Clause 
was ratified in 1963: then, as now, it establishes criteria for eligibility, 
allows states to decide whether municipalities may seek Chapter 9 
relief, and authorizes the bankruptcy court to impair contracts to 
which a debtor municipality is a party as part of a plan of 
adjustment.256  The City argued that the Pension Clause, which was 
enacted after the Chapter 9 regime was in place, is consistent with the 
                                                                                                                 
 253. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 31. 
 254. See id. at 26 (citing AFSCME Objection to Eligibility, supra note 246). 
 255. Id. (citing AFSCME Objection to Eligibility, supra note 246). 
 256. See id. 
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Chapter 9 regime, in that it ‘‘does not include any restrictions on the 
authorization or filing of municipal bankruptcy,’’ nor does it prevent 
the bankruptcy court from adjusting accrued pension-related debt. 257  
The City also argued that even if the Pension Clause could be 
interpreted to condition Detroit’s access to Chapter 9 relief on ring-
fencing, or to limit Detroit’s ability to use Chapter 9 to adjust debts, 
any such limits would prohibited and preempted under federal law.258  
The City argued that under the uniformity requirement and the 
Supremacy Clause,259 Congress’ power to enact a comprehensive 
federal scheme for bankruptcies ‘‘displaces any contrary state-law 
provisions that purport to alter or impair a debtor’s powers under the 
Bankruptcy Code.’’260  The City argued that while Michigan has the 
authority to decide whether to permit its municipalities to seek 
protection under Chapter 9, having chosen to permit Chapter 9 
filings, it does not have the authority to ‘‘override’’ the uniform 
scheme of federal bankruptcy through state laws which would limit or 
condition the tools of debt adjustment available to municipalities 
once in bankruptcy.261 
                                                                                                                 
 257. See City of Detroit’s Consolidated Reply to Objections to the Entry of an 
Order for Relief at 25, In re City of Detroit, Mich. No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2013).  As authority, the City’s pre-hearing papers cite 
several cases which held that municipalities were eligible to be Chapter 9 debtors, 
even though pensions were potentially vulnerable to impairment in bankruptcy, as 
well as an Alabama case where, reportedly, ‘‘chapter 9 has not only been authorized 
but, consistent with constitutional protections for contracts, has also been used to 
reduce pensions.’’ Id. at 27 (citing In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 222 (Bankr. E.D. 
Ca. 2013); Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo (In re City of 
Vallejo), 408 B.R. 280 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009); In re City of Prichard at 6--7, No. 99-
13465 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Oct. 6, 2000) (Dkt. No. 123) (order confirming plan of 
adjustment reducing all existing and future pension benefits payments by 8.5%)). 
 258. See id. at 29--31. 
 259. See id. 
 260. Id. at 30 (citing In re City of Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 16 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012)). 
 261. Id.; see also In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 76--77 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009); 
aff’d sub nom. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 2376 v. City of Vallejo (In re City of 
Vallejo), 432 B.R. 262 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (‘‘Incorporating state substantive law into 
chapter 9 to amend, modify or negate substantive provisions of chapter 9 would 
violate Congress’ ability to enact uniform bankruptcy laws.’’); Stockton, 478 B.R. at 
16 (‘‘A state cannot . . . condition or . . . qualify, i.e., to ‘cherry pick,’ the application 
of the Bankruptcy Code provisions that apply in chapter 9 cases after such a case has 
been filed.’’); Cnty. Of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Cnty. of Orange), 191 
B.R. 1005, 1020 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding (1) Chapter 9 sets priorities among 
creditors such that state statute setting priority could be preempted by federal law; 
and (2) deviating from federal scheme would ‘‘violate the constitutional mandate for 
uniform bankruptcy laws’’ by determining creditor priorities based on factors that 
vary from state to state). 
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In rejecting the Objectors’ uniformity requirement challenge, 
Judge Rhodes held that Chapter 9 does exactly what the uniformity 
requirement mandates ----- namely, it applies uniformly to all Chapter 
9 debtors.262  Here, the relevant class of debtors is the universe of 
municipal entities that meets the eligibility requirements of Section 
109(c) of the bankruptcy code.263  As Judge Rhodes recognized, one 
such qualification is that the entity is ‘‘specifically authorized . . . to be 
a debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a governmental 
officer or organization empowered by State law to authorize such 
entity to be a debtor under such chapter.’’’264  Citing Stellwagen v. 
Clum,265 Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses,266 and Schultz v. United 
States,267 Judge Rhodes held that as long as the specifically authorized 
requirement is applied to the class of eligible debtors, ‘‘it is of no 
consequence in the uniformity analysis that this requirement of state 
authorization to file a chapter 9 case may lead to different results in 
different states.’’268 
The Court dealt more harshly with the Objectors’ argument that 
Chapter 9 is unconstitutional under the Contracts Clause, deeming it 
‘‘frivolous.’’269  Noting that Chapter 9 is a federal law, Judge Rhodes 
held that the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution (which 
provides, ‘‘No state shall . . .  pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts . . . .’’) does not prohibit Congress from 
enacting a law impairing the obligation of contracts.270  Quoting In re 
City of Stockton,271 Judge Rhodes found that ‘‘[t]he Bankruptcy 
Clause necessarily authorizes Congress to make laws that would 
impair contracts.  It has long been understood that bankruptcy law 
entails impairment of contracts.’’ 272  Because contract impairment is 
at the heart of any bankruptcy proceeding, Judge Rhodes rejected the 
                                                                                                                 
 262. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 27. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012)). 
 265. 245 U.S. 605 (1918). 
 266. 186 U.S. 181 (1902). 
 267. 529 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 268. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 27. 
 269. Id. at 28.  The Contracts Clause, which is Article I, Section 10 of the United 
States Constitution provides, ‘‘No State shall . . . . pass any . . . Law Impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts . . . .’’ U.S. CONST. art. I § 10.  The Objectors had argued that 
Chapter 9 violates the Contracts Clause because it permits the impairment of 
contracts. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 26. 
 270. Id. (emphasis added); see also U.S. CONST. article I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 271. 478 B.R. 8 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012). 
 272. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 40 (citing In re City of 
Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 15 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012)). 
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idea that the Contracts Clause makes Chapter 9 unconstitutional on 
its face. 
Although the role of state choice figures more centrally in Judge 
Rhodes’’’ as applied’’ analysis under the Tenth Amendment 
(discussed below), it is worth noting that other courts have cited the 
constitutional imperative for uniformity in rejecting the idea that 
states can pick and choose how Chapter 9 will apply-----particularly 
with regard to priorities.  For example, in the Orange County 
bankruptcy, the court held that California was not at liberty to 
determine absolutely debtors’ property interests/rights through state 
law, having consented to the availability of Chapter 9 relief for 
eligible debtors: 
 If chapter 9 permitted states to define all properties of the debtor 
in bankruptcy regardless of the situation and to rewrite bankruptcy 
priorities, then chapter 9 would become a balkanized landscape of 
questionable value. Moreover, chapter 9 would violate the 
constitutional mandate for uniform bankruptcy laws. 
 Reserving to bankruptcy law the setting of priorities in chapter 9 
does not unnecessarily impinge on states’ rights or the ability of a 
municipal debtor to provide important services to the public. Nor 
does this principle conflict with Code § 903, which reserves to the 
state the power to control the municipal debtor in the exercise of its 
political or governmental powers. 
 Furthermore, pursuant to Code § 109(c)(2), a municipal debtor 
must be specifically authorized by state law to file a chapter 9 . . . By 
authorizing the use of chapter 9 by its municipalities, California 
must accept chapter 9 in its totality; it cannot cherry pick what it 
likes while disregarding the rest. The right to discharge is not a 
benefit without burdens. 
 As the court in In re City of Columbia Falls, Montana, Special 
Improvement Dist., No. 25, 143 B.R. 750, 759 (Bankr.D.Mont.1992), 
held in approving a chapter 9 plan of adjustment where the plan did 
not pay prepetition bondholders the full amount of their claim with 
interest in contravention of state law, ‘‘to create a federal statute 
based upon a theory that federal intervention was necessary to 
permit adjustment of a municipality’s debts and then to prohibit the 
municipality from adjusting such debts is not, in the point of the 
view of this Court, a logical or necessary result.273 
                                                                                                                 
 273. See In re County of Orange, 191 B.R. 1005, 1020--21 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 
1996) (citations omitted); see also In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 76--77 (Bankr. 
E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d sub nom., Int’l Bd. of Elec. Workers, Local 2376 v. City of 
Vallejo (In re City of Vallejo), 432 B.R. 262 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (‘‘Incorporating state 
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This line of cases suggests that having consented to Chapter 9 relief 
for eligible debtors, Michigan may not limit Detroit’s access to 
Chapter 9, or to the tools of adjustment available in Chapter 9, 
without running afoul of the uniformity requirement and supremacy 
rules. 
2. Chapter 9 Does Not Violate the Tenth Amendment. 
Several of the Objectors also argued that Chapter 9 is facially 
unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment because it unduly 
impinges upon state sovereignty.274  Judge Rhodes rejected this 
argument as well.  Citing the seminal United States v. Bekins case, 
Judge Rhodes held that ‘‘[t]he question of whether a federal 
municipal bankruptcy act can be administered consistent with the 
principles of federalism reflected in the Tenth Amendment has 
already been decided’’ by the Supreme Court in Bekins-----
affirmatively.275  In Bekins, ‘‘the Supreme Court specifically upheld 
the constitutionality of the Municipal Corporation Bankruptcy Act, 
50 Stat. 653 (1937), over objections that the statute violated the Tenth 
Amendment.’’276  Considering Bekins and its progeny, Judge Rhodes 
held that Bekins remains good authority and reasoned that the states’ 
ability to consent (or not) to the availability of Chapter 9 relief for 
their municipalities is key to Bekins continued force.277  Judge Rhodes 
observed that, ‘‘[i]f the state is acting voluntarily, it is free to engage 
with the federal government across a broad range of subject areas.  
The Tenth Amendment is violated only when the state does not 
consent.’’278  So, while the federal government cannot (and does not 
through Chapter 9) compel states to authorize municipalities to file 
for Chapter 9 relief, and while municipalities are not free to seek 
Chapter 9 relief without state authorization (in recognition of state 
sovereignty), states can decide to engage with the federal government 
by authorizing municipal bankruptcy for political subdivision under 
Chapter 9 without running afoul of federalism and state sovereignty 
principles embodied in the Tenth Amendment.279 
                                                                                                                 
substantive law into chapter 9 to amend, modify or negate substantive provisions of 
chapter 9 would violate Congress’ ability to enact uniform bankruptcy laws.’’). 
 274. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 28--29; AFSCME 
Objection to Eligibility, supra note 246, at 15--16. 
 275. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 32. 
 276. Id. (citing United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 53--54 (1938)). 
 277. Id. at 32--38. 
 278. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 37. 
 279. Id. at 37--38.  In so holding, Judge Rhodes read Faitoutie Iron & Steel Co. v. 
City of Asbury Park, New Jersey, 316 U.S. 502, (1942) as limited to its own facts. Id. 
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C. Chapter 9 Is Constitutional ‘‘As Applied’’ 
State choice also played a key role in Judge Rhodes’ analysis of the 
‘‘as applied’’ challenge to Chapter 9.  Several of the Objectors argued 
that Chapter 9 is unconstitutional as applied to the extent it would 
permit Michigan to authorize one of its political subdivisions to file 
for bankruptcy without explicitly ring-fencing or otherwise explicitly 
protecting vested pension benefits, given that neither Michigan nor 
Detroit can impair accrued pension benefits under the Pension 
Clause.280  In rejecting this challenge, Judge Rhodes found that while 
Michigan and Detroit cannot adjust Detroit’s accrued pension-related 
obligations, the bankruptcy court is not so constrained.281 
Judge Rhodes’ ruling is based on two key holdings.  First, as noted 
previously, Judge Rhodes found that the bankruptcy code permits, 
and in fact anticipates, that the bankruptcy court will impair contracts 
as part of any plan of adjustment.282  In fact, debt adjustment is the 
raison d’être of bankruptcy, as the court recognized in the City of 
Stockton bankruptcy case, in a passage Judge Rhodes quotes: 
 In other words, while a state cannot make a law impairing the 
obligation of contract, Congress can do so.  The goal of the 
Bankruptcy Code is adjusting the debtor-creditor relationship.  
Every discharge impairs contracts.  While bankruptcy law endeavors 
to provide a system of orderly, predictable rules or treatment of 
parties whose contracts are impaired, that does not change the 
starring role of contract impairment in bankruptcy. 
 It follows, then, that contracts may be impaired on this chapter 9 
case without offending the Constitution.  The Bankruptcy Clause 
gives Congress express power to legislate uniform laws of 
bankruptcy that result in impairment of contract; and Congress is 
not subject to the restriction that the Contracts Clause places on 
states.’’ 283 
                                                                                                                 
at 34--35.  In Asbury Park, a New Jersey state court ‘‘authorized’’ an adjustment plan, 
making certain bonds significantly more valuable. 316 U.S. at 507--08, 512--13.  
Although the Supreme Court sustained this alternation of a municipal bond contract, 
it was careful to state that its holding did ‘‘not go beyond the case before’’ it. Id. at 
516.  Noting that the ‘‘limited application of Asbury Park to its own facts has been 
repeatedly recognized,’’ Judge Rhodes held that it is now ‘‘firmly established that the 
Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution bars a state from enacting 
municipal bankruptcy legislation.’’ Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 35. 
 280. Id. at 40. 
 281. See id. at 40. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 40--41 (citing In re City of Stockton, Cal., 478 B.R. 8, 16 (Bankr. E.D. 
Cal. 2012). 
832 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLI 
Mindful of the bankruptcy court’s power to impair contracts, Judge 
Rhodes held that ‘‘[f]or Tenth Amendment and state sovereignty 
purposes, nothing distinguishes pension debt in a municipal 
bankruptcy case from any other debt.’’284  Under Bekins, so long as 
the state consents to Chapter 9, a bankruptcy court may adjust 
municipal debts (including pension debts) as part of a larger plan of 
adjust without infringing on state sovereignty-----even if the debt 
implicates rights or property interests that otherwise protected by the 
state constitution, and even if the State could not so act.285 
Second, Judge Rhodes found, after a lengthy review of precedent 
and legislative history, that pension rights are a contractual obligation 
under the Michigan Constitution, and thus subject to adjustment in a 
Chapter 9 proceeding along with other contract debts.286  Judge 
Rhodes based this holding on (a) the language of the Michigan 
Constitution, which states that pension rights are a ‘‘contractual 
obligation,’’ (b) Michigan case law, including Kosa v. State Treasurer 
of Michigan,287 and In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding 
Constitutionality of 2011 Pa. 38;288 and (c) the legislative history of the 
Pension Clause as recounted in Kosa.289 
With respect to legislative history, Judge Rhodes observed that, at 
common law, public pensions were treated as ‘‘gratuitous allowances 
that could be revoked at will’’ prior to actual distribution as a matter 
of contract law.290  The Pension Clause, which was included in the 
constitution adopted in Michigan in 1963, speaks to this issue in 
contract law terms: it states that ‘‘[t]he accrued financial benefits of 
each pension plan and retirement system of the state and its political 
subdivisions shall be a contractual obligation thereof which shall not 
                                                                                                                 
 284. See id. at 41. 
 285. Id. at 40--41. 
 286. Id. at 40--41. 
 287. 292 N.W.2d 452 (Mich. 1980). 
 288. 806 N.W.2d 683 (Mich. 2011). 
 289. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 42--44. 
 290. Id. at 41 (citing Brown v. Highland Park, 30 N.W.2d 798, 800 (Mich. 1948) 
(‘‘We are convinced that the majority of cases in other jurisdictions establishes the 
rule that a pension granted by public authorities is not a contractual obligation, that 
the pensioner has no vested right, and that a pension is terminable at the will of a 
municipality, at least while acting within reasonable limits.  At best plaintiffs in this 
case have an expectancy based upon continuance of existing charter provisions.’’).  
Judge Rhodes also cited Kosa, where the court observed, ‘‘Until the adoption of 
Const. 1963, art. 9, § 24, legislative appropriation for retirement fund reserves was 
considered to be an ex gratia action. Consequently, the most that could be said about 
pre-con legislative appropriations for retirees was that there was some kind of 
implied commitment to fund pension reserves.’’ Kosa, 292 N.W.2d at 459 (citation 
omitted). 
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be diminished or impaired thereby.’’291  In a passage cited by Judge 
Rhodes, the Michigan Supreme Court in Kosa referenced the 
following discourse from legislative history respecting the Pensions 
Clause which suggests that the Pension Clause was intended to give 
pensioners a contractual right to accrued pension benefits: 
 MR. VAN DUSEN: Mr. Chairman, if I may elaborate briefly on 
Mr. Brake’s answer to Mr. Downs’ question, I would like to indicate 
that the words ‘accrued financial benefits’ were used designedly, so 
that the contractual right of the employee would be limited to the 
deferred compensation embodied in any pension plan, and that we 
hope to avoid thereby a proliferation of litigation by individual 
participants in retirement systems talking about the general benefits 
structure, or something other than his specific right to receive 
benefits.  It is not intended that an individual employee should, as a 
result of this language, be given the right to sue the employing unit 
to require the actuarial funding of past service benefits, or anything 
of that nature.  What it is designed to do is to say that when his 
benefits come due, he’s got a contractual right to receive them. And, 
in answer to your second question, he has the contractual right to 
sue for them.  So that he has no particular interest in the funding of 
somebody else’s benefits as long as he has the contractual right to 
sue for his. 
 ‘‘MR. DOWNS: I appreciate Mr. Van Dusen’s comments.  Again, 
I want to see if I understand this.  Then he would not have a remedy 
of legally forcing the legislative body each year to set aside the 
appropriate amount, but when the money did come due this would 
be a contractual right for which he could sue a ministerial officer 
that could be mandamused or enjoined; is that correct? 
 ‘‘MR. VAN DUSEN: That’s my understanding, Mr. Downs.’’292 
In another passage quoted by the Judge Rhodes, the Kosa court 
also summarized the Pension Clause using the language of contract: 
To sum up, while the Legislature’s constitutional contractual 
obligation is not to impair ‘‘accrued financial benefits,’’ even if that 
obligation also related to the funding system, there would be no 
impairment of the contractual obligation because the substituted 
‘‘entry age normal’’ system supports the benefit structure as strongly 
as the replaced ‘‘attained age’’ system.293 
Based on case law and the cited legislative history, Judge Rhodes 
concluded that the Pension Clause treats accrued pension rights as 
                                                                                                                 
 291. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra at 42 (citing MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24). 
 292. Id. at 42 (emphasis added) (quoting Kosa, 292 N.W.2d at 459 n.21). 
 293. Id. at 42 (emphasis added) (citing Kosa, 292 N.W.2d at 461). 
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contract rights, and that it does not confer extraordinary protection 
beyond that available to contracts generally.294  In so holding, Judge 
Rhodes rejected arguments advanced by the Michigan Attorney 
General and the Objectors the Michigan Pensions Clause represents 
an ‘‘impermeable imperative’’ which prohibits the adjustment of 
accrued pension-related debt under any circumstances (save 
(presumably) through constitutional reform).295 
In addition to Michigan case law and the legislative history, Judge 
Rhodes also cited the larger context surrounding the Pension Clause 
as grounds for his ruling.  Judge Rhodes noted that the Bekins Court 
had held that municipal bankruptcy was constitutional by the time the 
Pension Clause was adopted.296  With Bekins in place, the Michigan 
legislature then elected to allow its political subdivisions to file 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy.  Judge Rhodes reasoned that if the Michigan 
legislature had wanted to give accrued pension benefits special 
protection against impairment in a Chapter 9 proceeding, it could 
have ‘‘prohibited Michigan municipalities from filing 
bankruptcy[,] . . . created a property interest that bankruptcy would 
be required to respect under Butner v. United 
States[,]297 . . . established some sort of a secured interest in the 
municipality’s property[,] . . . [or] explicitly required the State to 
guaranty pension benefits.’’298   But, as Judge Rhodes recognized, the 
Michigan legislature ‘‘did none of those.’’299  Instead, it used the 
language of contract, and allowed for the possibility of adjustment 
though Chapter 9.300  With the Michigan Legislature having failed to 
confer extraordinary protections on accrued pension benefits when 
the Pension Clause was enacted, Judge Rhodes was not willing to 
imply such protections under either Pension Clause or Chapter 9. 
Judge Rhodes’ holding is well-grounded in legislative history, 
precedent and construction.  As Judge Rhodes observed, at common 
law, pensions were viewed as ‘‘allowances that could be revoked at 
will, because a retiree lacked any vested right in their continuation.’’301  
                                                                                                                 
 294. Id. at 43. 
 295. See Attorney General Bill Schuette’s Statement Regarding the Michigan 
Constitution & the Bankruptcy of the City of Detroit at 15, In re City of Detroit, 
Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2013). 
 296. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 44. 
 297. 440 U.S. 48 (1979) (holding that property issues in bankruptcy are determined 
according to state law). 
 298. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 44. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. at 41. 
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The legislative history, as interpreted by the Michigan Supreme Court 
in Kosa, suggests that accrued pension benefits were accorded the 
status of contract rights when the Pension Clause was added to the 
Michigan Constitution in 1963 to prevent state officials from revoking 
a grant of pension benefits any time prior to distribution.302  In effect, 
the Pension Clause makes the promise to provide a pension binding 
as a matter of contract law.  By using the language of contract, and its 
permitting municipalities to file for Chapter 9 protection, the 
Michigan legislature did not evince an intent to give accrued pension 
benefits the extraordinary protection sought by the Objectors. 
D. Cautionary Language, and a Hobson’s Choice for City 
Managers 
It is important to note that Judge Rhodes was in no way cavalier 
about the impact of his decision respecting accrued pension benefits.  
To the contrary, he made it clear that he will not confirm a plan of 
adjustment that puts the burden of Detroit’s debts unfairly on the 
backs of the City’s retired public workers: 
[T]he Court is compelled to comment.  No one should interpret this 
holding that pension rights are subject to impairment in this 
bankruptcy case to mean that the Court will necessarily confirm any 
plan of adjustment that impairs pensions.  The Court emphasizes 
that it will not lightly or casually exercise the power under federal 
bankruptcy law to impair pensions.  Before the Court confirms any 
plan that the City Submits, the Court must find that the plan fully 
meets the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 943(b) and the other 
applicable provisions of the bankruptcy code.  Together, these 
provisions of law demand this Court’s judicious legal and equitable 
consideration of the interests of the City and all of its creditors, as 
well as the laws of the State of Michigan.303 
                                                                                                                 
 302. Id. at 41--43. 
 303. Id. at 44.  11 U.S.C. §§ 943(b)(4) and 1129(a)(s) of the Bankruptcy Code 
provide that for a plan to be confirmable, it most have been proposed in good faith 
and ‘‘not by any means forbidden by law,’’ and that the debtor must not be 
‘‘prohibited by law from taking any action necessary to carry out the plan,’’ 
respectively.  In In re Sanitary & Improvement Dist. #7, the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nebraska refused to confirm a plan containing a 
bondholder discount prohibited by state law as contrary to the requirements of 11 
U.S.C. §§ 943(b)(4) and 1129(a)(s) of the Bankruptcy Code. 98 B.R. 970, 973 (Bankr. 
D. Neb. 1989).  Even if the Pensions Clause does not bar impairment in bankruptcy, 
the treatment of pension debt in the Michigan Constitution likely will weigh on the 
City and Judge Rhodes in drafting, and considering for confirmation, any plan of 
adjustment. 
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In fact, Judge Rhodes spoke at length about the realities of 
Detroit’s insolvency when explaining his ruling, and he urged 
stakeholders to address the human costs that insolvency and, 
potentially, pension adjustment, will have on retirees and citizens 
alike.304  Judge Rhodes recognized that Detroit’s pensioners are 
among the City’s most vulnerable stakeholders, and while he has 
continued to push for a consensual resolution, he has put all parties 
on notice that he will scrutinize any plan of adjustment for 
compliance with the letter and intent of the code.305 
But if Judge Rhodes recognized the special vulnerability of the 
City’s pensioners, he also recognized that the City’s citizens are 
vulnerable too, beset by crime, unemployment, poverty, woefully 
inadequate services, and years of political corruption.306  In effect, 
Judge Rhodes treats Detroit’s residents as another creditor 
constituency in his Opinion, owed a debt in the form of at least 
minimally acceptable infrastructure and public services.  While the 
impairment of pension benefits is, obviously, horrible to contemplate, 
retirees may receive even less in the future if the city is unable to 
adjust its debts and emerge from bankruptcy with a viable recovery 
plan in place.  Indeed, if Detroit truly is to recover, it needs a plan----- 
one in which people and businesses return to the City and contribute 
tax revenue to the city’s fiscal health, and one in which the City is able 
to provide at least basic public services.307  The longer this is not 
possible, the less likely it is that pension-holders will, over the long 
                                                                                                                 
 304. See, e.g., Hearing on Statement Regarding Eligibility Ruling, In re City of 
Detroit, Michigan, No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2013), 
available at http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/apps/detroit/DetroitAudio.cfm; Opinion 
Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 81; see also Hearing on Eligibility Objections, 
In re City of Detroit, Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 
15--16, 2013), available at http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/apps/detroit/Detroit 
Audio.cfm. 
 305. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 81; see also Editorial, For 
Detroit’s Retirees, Michigan’s Pension Promise Must Be Kept, DETROIT FREE PRESS, 
Aug. 1, 2013, http://www.freep.com/article/20130801/OPINION01/308010019/ 
michigan-constitution-pensions-detroit (‘‘Among the city’s claimants, retirees are the 
most vulnerable. Their payouts are meager-----an average of $30,000 a year for police 
and fire, $19,000 for other city employees-----but absolutely crucial to their survival. 
And even though the pension systems’ elected leadership mismanaged funds, made 
poor investments and overstated the funds’ health, to visit the consequences of those 
missteps on recipients is a Dickensian nightmare.’’).  Judge Rhodes cited the $18,000 
figure in his opinion regarding eligibility. See Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra 
note 1, at 6. 
 306. Opinion Regarding Eligibility, supra note 1, at 81. 
 307. See, e.g. id. at 18--19. 
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term, receive anything close to the benefits which they were 
promised. 
Finally, one wonders whether there was an element of pragmatism 
involved in Judge Rhodes’ ruling, along with Constitutional analysis.  
(Though, in questioning whether practical realities played a role, I do 
not mean to suggest that Judge Rhodes’ ruling is legally suspect.  In 
fact, I think Judge Rhodes’ ruling on impairment is correct.)  Had 
Judge Rhodes taken accrued pension benefits off the table entirely at 
the eligibility stage, the Objectors might have simply walked away 
from mediation and any attempt at a consensual resolution.  By 
contrast, if impairment is a possibility, the Objectors might have more 
incentive and leeway to negotiate.  The possibility of pension 
impairment almost might spur a political solution-----in the form of 
state involvement-----as well, though that is of course not a certainty 
(and, perhaps not even a possibility) at this time.  Once the City has 
established a sustainable economic model, pension-holders could be 
put first in line for additional recoveries if and when the city’s 
fortunes improve.  And, both the City and its pensioners may have a 
strong moral claim on the State to mitigate the real and pain and 
suffering that both the City and its pensioners are experiencing as a 
result of the City’s financial collapse.  But some adjustment (or, at 
least the possibility of adjustment) may be necessary as a practical 
matter, if Detroit is to have any chance at getting back on its feet. 
III.  WILL UNLIMITED TAX GENERAL OBLIGATION 
BONDHOLDERS TAKE A HAIRCUT? 
Although not addressed in the Opinion Regarding Eligibility, a 
second key issue presented by Detroit’s bankruptcy is whether 
unlimited tax general obligation (UTGO) bondholders can and 
should be treated as unsecured debt, and thus on par with other 
unsecured obligations (including pension-related COP liability), in 
the bankruptcy.  In his June 14, 2013 proposal for creditors, 
Emergency Manager Orr rattled bondholders (and markets) by 
categorizing these obligations as unsecured, such that all UTGO 
bonds (other than those additionally secured by a state intercept 
payment) would be treated on a pari passu basis with all general fund 
obligations, then proposing a plan of reorganization that would have 
meant a substantial haircut for bondholders.308  Suggestions that the 
                                                                                                                 
 308. See PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS, supra note 3, at 98 (including in estimate of 
unsecured claims UTGO bonds not additionally secured by state interceptor 
payments and unsecured pension and OPEB). 
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obligation to tax might be limited by tax cap legislation and economic 
necessity raised questions about what the ‘‘full faith and credit’’ and 
pledge of taxing power means, especially in the case of a deeply 
insolvent municipality like Detroit.309 
Market reaction to Orr’s characterization was swift, and 
unsurprisingly, negative.  In a letter to Michigan Governor Snyder, 
the industry trade association SIFMA argued that the pledge of 
taxing power ought to make UTGO bonds ‘‘first budget obligations’’ 
backed by an obligation to raise property taxes to levels necessary to 
repay principal and interest: 
Detroit has issued a number of different types of securities with 
different sources of repayment and security, as described in the 
offering documents for each transaction.  Market expectation is 
there would be different treatment for holders of different types of 
securities.  It is generally the expectation of market participants that 
holders of general obligation unlimited tax bonds would be paid 
principal and interest as it comes due, based on a pledge of the 
debtor’s ‘‘full faith, and credit’’ to repay the bonds, in addition to the 
characterization of the bonds as ‘‘first budget obligations, including 
the proceeds of annual ad valorem property taxes, which must, to 
the extent necessary, be levied on all taxable property.’’  This pledge 
is seen by the capital markets to be an obligation to raise property 
taxes to the level necessary to pay the principal and interest in the 
bonds as they come due.  The Michigan Constitution also provides 
that repayment of voter approved bonded indebtedness is 
guaranteed.310 
The SIFMA letter distinguished the city’s obligations with respect 
to UTGO bonds from those associated with certificates of 
participation which, according to SIMFA, are not backed by a full 
faith and credit pledge.311  SIFMA argued that treating the UTGO 
bonds on par with unsecured contractual obligations (such as those at 
issue in the City’s COPs) would be contrary to offering materials and 
would hurt Detroit along with other Michigan municipalities: 
                                                                                                                 
 309. See id. at 120 app. E (listing $410,830,000 in unlimited tax general obligation 
bonds on schedule of unsecured general obligation liabilities as of June 30, 2012). 
 310. Letter from Ira Hammerman, Gen. Counsel, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n to 
Richard Snyder, Gov., State of Mich. (July 18, 2013), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/SifmaDetroit.pdf. 
 311. Id.  Instead, offering documents for the certifications of participation 
reportedly describe the instruments as unsecured contractual obligations that are 
‘‘not general obligations of the City, and neither the faith and credit, taxing power 
nor any specific revenues of the City are pledged’’ thereto. Id. 
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Any action that would permit general obligation bonds to be treated 
on a pari passu basis with unsecured contractual obligations that are 
not backed by a full faith and credit pledge ignores the appropriate 
priority that should be given to these bonds.  We believe that any 
such treatment will have a long lasting negative impact on the ability 
of Michigan’s municipalities to obtain financing on favorable 
terms . . . [M]arket participants may be reluctant to purchase 
Michigan general obligation unlimited tax bonds and general 
obligation limited tax bonds in the future, causing the cost of 
financing infrastructure projects to rise.312 
Finally, SIFMA argued that treating UTGO bonds on par with the 
City’s outstanding COPs could have a destabilizing effect on the 
municipal market as a whole, with Michigan municipalities 
particularly at risk.313  Around the same time, Ambac (a bond insurer, 
which reportedly is the insurer on several of the UTGO issuances at 
issue) released a press release raising many of the same concerns.314 
On November 8 and 13, 2013, three monoline insurers of 
outstanding bonds issued by Detroit filed a complaint for declaratory 
judgment in the bankruptcy, seeking entry of an order declaring that 
Detroit must levy, collect, and apply ad valorem taxes for the sole 
purpose of paying the principal and interest on unlimited tax bonds 
insured by the plaintiffs.315  The complaint alleges that the unlimited 
tax bonds at issue are ‘‘[u]nique among the City’s financial 
obligations,’’ in that they were issued ‘‘only after resolutions by the 
City Council, the legislative body of the City, and approval by a 
majority of the voters in a city-wide election establishing a pledge of 
ad valorem taxes, as security, to repay these obligations 
exclusively.’’316  The complaint further alleges that ‘‘in approving each 
bond referendum, [Detroit’s] voters authorized the City to exceed 
otherwise applicable maximum rate for ad valorem taxes’’ set forth in 
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the Michigan Constitution.317  The plaintiffs argue that Detroit 
already had reached the tax rate limitations set forth in the Michigan 
Constitution at the time of issuance,318 and that the voters’ approval of 
the issuances, coupled with resolutions adopted by Detroit’s City 
Council, require Detroit to levy ad valorem taxes in amounts 
sufficient to repay bondholders notwithstanding tax rate limitations, 
and to collect and apply tax receipts for the sole purpose of meeting 
debt service obligations.319 
Precedent respecting whether Detroit can use Chapter 9 and/or tax 
cap legislation to treat UTGO bonds as unsecured, and on a pari 
passu basis with other unsecured obligations, is thin.  There is some 
authority for the proposition that, under 1988 amendments made to 
the Bankruptcy Code, voter-authorized general-obligation debt for 
capital projects backed by a specific tax levy that do not feed the 
general fund would be considered special-revenue debt, which is 
secured.  In January 2012, for example, the bankruptcy court in the 
Jefferson County bankruptcy case divested a state court-appointed 
receiver for the county’s sewer system from possession of the sewer 
system, and granted the bondholders the right to reach net sewer 
system revenues collected by the county after the filing of the Chapter 
9 petition.320  Citing the 1988 amendments to the bankruptcy code, the 
court held that, ‘‘[t]he structure and intent of what Congress enacted 
by its 1988 amendments to chapter 9 was to provide a mechanism 
whereby the pledged special revenues would continue to be paid 
uninterrupted to those to which/whom payment of the sewer system’s 
indebtedness is secured by a lien on special revenues.’’321  The result, 
according to the Alabama court, is that ‘‘11 U.S.C. § 922(d) excludes 
continued payment of these pledged special revenues to the 
lienholder from being staying under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) or 11 U.S.C. § 
922(a).’’322  As to Detroit issuances with similar language, bondholders 
may have an argument under the theory adopted by the Alabama 
bankruptcy court. 
To the extent that Detroit pledged its taxing power without regard 
to any constitutional, statutory or charter tax-rate limitations, issues 
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remain knotty.  The impact of tax cap legislation on municipal 
finances has long been a subject of debate, with some opining that tax 
caps have contributed to insolvency in places like Orange County and 
Vallejo.323  Moreover, the legal relationship between tax caps and 
debt limits on one hand, and a pledge of taxing power on the other, 
remains nuanced.  In Flushing National Bank v. Municipal Assistance 
Corp., for example, the New York Court of Appeals held that a city 
may not contract indebtedness under the New York State 
Constitution unless it has, ‘‘pledged its faith and credit for the 
payment of the principal thereof and the interest thereon,’’ an 
obligation which the court described as both ‘‘a commitment to pay 
and a commitment of the city’s revenue generating powers to produce 
the funds to pay.’’324  The Flushing Court further held that this regime 
‘‘express[es] a constitutional imperative: debt obligations must be 
paid even if tax limits be exceeded.’’325  But Flushing is a complicated 
case, in no small measure because while the Court declared the 
moratorium statute at issue unconstitutional, it nevertheless sought to 
facilitate a political/legislative solution.326  Furthermore, the year after 
Flushing was decided, the Court of Appeals modified its views 
somewhat in Quirk v. Municipal Assistance Corp., holding that only 
real property taxes are subject to the prior lien of first revenue.327  
Given political and economic consequences, it is perhaps not 
surprising other cities facing financial distress (e.g., Vallejo, Central 
Falls, Rhode Island328 and Harrisburg) reportedly worked with 
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creditors to ensure that bondholders get paid rather than litigate 
through to a decision. 
In Detroit’s case, while Judge Rhodes has not yet considered 
bondholder claims, these debts would appear to be contractual in 
nature, and thus potentially subject to adjustment notwithstanding 
pledges of taxing power.  As between bondholders, the precise 
language requirements of individual issuances may be important.  
UTGO bondholders who can make arguments under the theory 
adopted in the Jefferson County case, and/or those holding bonds 
containing a pledge to raise taxes notwithstanding tax caps, or other 
similar legislation, may have stronger claims of priority under theories 
advanced in cases such as Flushing and Quirk, compared to issuances 
without such language.  Whatever arguments are made, however, the 
reality is as noted above: Detroit does not have the money, and even 
if it can (and must) tax, it cannot raise enough money through 
taxation to make a meaningful dent in the City’s first budget 
obligations due to the City’s economic plight.  In these circumstances, 
paying bondholders before pensioners, in the face of the Pensions 
Clause, seems unlikely.  Perhaps for these and related reasons, Judge 
Rhodes has referred bondholders to mediation, most recently in the 
days and weeks immediately following his ruling respecting 
eligibility.329 
IV.  WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE US? 
So, if the legal landscape is uncertain, and the economic situation 
dire, where does that leave us?  While there certainly are political 
obstacles to honest conversations about debt adjustment, Detroit’s 
situation ought to spur conversations around reforms to municipal 
funding models and debt.  Following are a list of potential reforms 
that states and municipalities might consider to avoid some of the 
problems now plaguing Detroit. 
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First, states and their political subdivisions would do well develop 
and implement early warning systems containing unambiguous and 
non-voluntary consequences for municipalities that fall into financial 
distress.  Detroit’s problems were known, predictable and visible for 
many years prior to the bankruptcy filing.  While the State did adopt 
an intervention procedure (including the appointment of an 
emergency manager),330 one might argue that this was too little, too 
late.  In the future, states would do well to adopt metrics of fiscal 
distress that would identify struggling municipalities earlier to provide 
earlier feedback to state and local officials, citizens and public 
workers.331 
Second, having identified problems earlier, states should develop 
(or enhance) systems of intervention.  According to the Pew 
Charitable Trust, some nineteen states have intervention programs 
for distressed municipalities, with regimes using a range of strategies 
from technical assistance to receivers, emergency managers and 
control boards.332  Some regimes allow restructuring of finances, 
including debt, labor contracts, taxes, fees and creditors333 and some 
provide technical assistance and advice, while others offer loans and 
grants.334  (Interestingly, the Pew Charitable Trust found that 
Northeastern states are the most likely to have intervention laws: the 
Pew Trust speculated that this may be due to presence of many older 
cities dealing with the decline of their manufacturing base.335) 
With respect to intervention, I recommend robust systems of 
intervention (including oversight, technical, and financial assistance), 
particularly with regard to planned municipal bond offerings and 
related derivatives transactions.  With respect to governance, I have 
argued in earlier work that public officials and other stakeholders 
(including underwriters and swaps providers) ought to be subject to 
fiduciary duties when developing and implementing financing plans 
involving municipal securities and related derivatives transactions, 
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with particular attention to transactions involving complex 
instruments with interest rate risk and/or the possibility of high 
termination fees.336  I refer to and incorporate those arguments by 
reference here, on the theory that governance reforms are key to 
righting local governments’ financial ships.  Municipalities in distress 
should have alternatives to the kind of improvident, ‘‘kick the can’’ 
down the road transactions now plaguing Detroit.  Underwriters and 
derivatives providers should deal with distressed municipalities under 
a fiduciary standard when structuring funding and financing plans to 
avoid the temptation to sell structures and products that work over 
the short, but not the long, term.337  It may well be that existing 
regimes are ‘‘good enough’’ to deal with the kind of corruption seen in 
Jefferson County, Alabama and Detroit, as evidenced by the criminal 
convictions of public officials in those jurisdictions.  But, fiscal distress 
is not always the result of criminally sanctionable fraud.  Sometimes, 
it is the result of negligence-----of short-sighted, marginally self-
interested decision-making, the effects of which are felt over the long 
term.338  A uniform fiduciary standard at the time transactions are 
structured -----particularly one involving all of the financial 
professionals upon which cities, towns, villages, etc. depend-----could 
enhance governance and improve financial decision-making across 
the board.  Improving governance with respect to municipal securities 
and related transactions us not a cure-all, but it might help prevent or 
slow a city’s descent into insolvency. 
With respect to fiscal intervention, early warning systems could call 
upon states to intervene with financial assistance (whether in the form 
of grants, guarantees, etc.) at an earlier stage, with an eye towards 
preventing complete fiscal collapse.  Prior to distress, states might 
also do well to consider systems by which smaller municipalities can 
work with and through the state (through state agencies, public 
benefit corporations, or the like) to access public markets for 
borrowing.  Allowing smaller issuers, or issuers experiencing some 
distress, to work with and through the states will give these issuers 
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access to better technical and financial assistance, and may result in 
better ‘‘deal terms’’ and thus prevent or mitigate financial distress.339 
Obviously, financial intervention and assistance is the most 
controversial step in any regime-----while states do not want 
municipalities to fall into receivership or (where available) 
bankruptcy, they also do not want cities to incur debts on the 
assumption that the state will provide a bailout.  The reality is, 
however, that local governments are creatures of the state.  They have 
obligations because of state (and federal) legal and regulatory 
regimes, at least in part, and they depend on state aid in ways large 
and small.  If states do not like bailouts, either because of concerns 
about moral hazard or based on concerns about the consequences of 
allowing municipalities to default, then states should get involved 
earlier to help municipalities to make better decisions-----and, as a last 
resort, to backstop those decisions if a municipalities’ fortunes go 
awry. 
Third, states would do well to consider well-articulated 
intervention and reorganization/adjustment mechanisms earlier 
rather than later, so that plans and resources are in place before a 
crisis erupts.  When a municipality falls into financial distress, 
stakeholders may hold out for payment, on the assumption that they 
will be first in line for the issuer’s limited assets.  In the absence of 
work-out mechanisms, crises may erupt, linger, and get solved (if at 
all) in an ad-hoc fashion.  A more orderly restructuring of 
unsustainable debt-----through a statutory regime and/or control 
board-style mechanisms-----can reduce loss and enhance a 
municipality’s ability to return to fiscal stability.340  For states that 
have not yet implemented intervention or workout mechanisms of 
this sort, such reforms would make sense. 
These proposals are controversial and difficult to implement, as 
they implicate core questions of governance and representative 
democracy.  And, state intervention in local fiscal crises admittedly 
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has been controversial (as is the case in Detroit), and has met with a 
mixed record of success, due to concerns about loss of local control.341  
For all of these reasons, if distress metrics, interventions and/or work 
out mechanisms are to make a difference, they must involve all 
stakeholders in solutions, including taxpayers, public workers, retirees 
and bondholders.  While these stakeholders may be forced to the 
table through receivership or bankruptcy, these mechanisms involve 
rough justice.  Starting a dialogue earlier, under the auspices of state 
oversight and in the context of a regime that identifies and seeks to 
remediate difficulties early on, might enable solutions, or enhance the 
balancing of interests necessary to address fiscal strain. 
Apart from such mechanisms, some state and local governments 
have reduced benefits for workers who come into the system later.  
For example, New York State has done this through by placing 
employees into ‘‘tiers’’ with different levels of benefits, based on date 
of employment.342  State and local governments also have explored 
switching from away from defined benefit plans to a defined 
contribution model, at least for workers entering the system: at least 
thirteen states have introduced some form of defined contribution 
plan, according to the Center for Retirement Research at Boston 
College.343  In Michigan, for example, the state closed a defined 
benefit plan sponsored by Michigan State Employee retirement 
system to new entrants in 1997 and caused employees hired after that 
date to be enrolled in 401(k) administered by private financial 
services firm.344  Professor Michael Thom reportedly found that 
privatization has been a net positive for the state of Michigan during 
some fiscal periods (i.e., the 2008--2010), from a fiscal perspective.345  
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Finally, state and local governments also might consider 
implementing ERISA-style flexibility for benefits not yet accrued. 
At the end of the day, however, what is most needed to resolve 
local government fiscal distress is political courage-----something that 
inevitably is in short supply.  Public officials must be prepared to have 
honest conversations about what cities and towns need, and what they 
can afford.  And, they must be willing to advance cost-saving 
measures, even if particular constituencies might object.  Put simply, 
they ought to serve with candor and integrity, focused always on the 
best interest of the municipality and its citizen taxpayers, having been 
entrusted with citizens’ public safety and financial health.  For this 
reason, I restate and reaffirm my earlier argument that requiring 
fidelity to the public good-----via a mandatory, non-waivable fiduciary 
standard for public officials and stakeholders who market and sell 
financial products to municipalities-----would help to ensure that those 
in a position to bind the municipality make decisions that are in the 
municipality’s best interest, over the long term.346  This will not 
guarantee success-----but it will give municipalities a fighting chance.  
In these times, for cities like Detroit, perhaps that is all we can hope 
for. 
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